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Abstract 
This thesis explores the discourse on treaties and “self-sufficiency” between the 1969 
Canadian federal government’s White Paper and the 1970 Indian Association of 
Alberta’s Red Paper. The White Paper advocated individual “self-sufficiency,” while the 
Red Paper emphasized treaties, rather than individualism, as a source of Indian “self-
sufficiency.” The thesis examines the Red Paper as a political assertion and resistance to 
assimilation as proposed by the White Paper and, that the Red Paper regarded historical 
treaties as important to Indian people in Alberta and beyond. Michele Foucault’s concept 
of “power/knowledge” and Dale Turner’s critique of Western liberal ideas are used in the 
thesis to examine the idea of assimilation in the White Paper and used to illuminate the 
Red Paper’s position that treaties were essential to the “discourse” between the federal 
government and Indian leadership, such as the IAA, between 1969 and1971.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
Acknowledgements 
I am pleased to thank the many people who have helped me in the completion of this 
thesis. I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to my research co-
supervisor, Dr. Carol Williams for always encouraging me to think deeply and critically. 
I thank you for your patience and support, particularly during the difficult and 
challenging times in my research. I also would like to thank my second co-supervisor, Dr. 
Linda Many Guns for the many conversations around my thesis project; the conservations 
gave me the confidence to complete my thesis project. I also would like to thank my 
thesis committee for their time and patience and for believing in me throughout this 
project: Dr. Cheryl Currie, Dr. Bill Ramp, and Dr. Leroy Little Bear.  
This thesis project would not be successfully completed without the invaluable support 
and assistance of the University of Lethbridge Library staff. I would also like to express 
my appreciation to my cohort past and present, Ann Asfrid Holden, Alan Santinele 
Martino, Mark Carolle, and Kurt Lanno for the valuable feedback and support during my 
writing stage. 
I wish to thank the Post-Secondary Student Support Program at Old Sun College, in 
Siksika for your continued financial support throughout my thesis project. 
Finally, I wish to thank my family for your patience and support during the writing of my 
thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iv 
Introduction: The White Paper and the Red Paper .........................................................1 
Method .................................................................................................................................6 
Chapter One: Review of Literature ...............................................................................20 
Chapter Two-The Federal Perspective: The “end” of Indians ....................................60 
The Hawthorn Report 1966-1967 ..................................................................................61 
Pierre Trudeau and the Liberal’s Political Values ........................................................65 
Jean Chrétien: Trudeau’s Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development ........74 
The Contents of the White Paper....................................................................................79 
Public Response to the White Paper ..............................................................................83 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................94 
Chapter Three-The Indian Leadership Responds: The IAA and Citizen Plus: the 
Red Paper ..........................................................................................................................96 
The 1970 Red Paper .....................................................................................................100 
The Evolution of the IAA ..............................................................................................106 
Harold Cardinal, President of the IAA ........................................................................117 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................124 
Chapter Four-Governance: A Comparative Analysis of the White Paper’s and Red 
Paper’s vision for Indians ..............................................................................................125 
Pre-existing Historical Agreements and Government and Indian Relationship ..........131 
Comparing the White Paper and the Red Paper ..........................................................140 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................146 
Final Conclusion.............................................................................................................148 
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................158
1 
 Introduction: The White Paper and the Red Paper 
 
 In the month of June in 1969, the federal government announced its Statement of 
the Government of Canada on Indian Policy (hereafter, the White Paper). The White 
Paper proposed to call to end discrimination against Indians by abolishing all legal 
recognition of registered Indians within various federal legislation. In 1970, in response 
to the White Paper, the Chiefs of the Indian Association of Alberta (hereafter, the IAA) 
produced a counter document titled Citizens Plus: the Red Paper (hereafter, the Red 
Paper). The purpose of this thesis is to explore the dynamics of the White Paper and Red 
Paper including their intent and outcomes.  
 The Red Paper was an act of resistance by the IAA that was predicated on two 
key points of resistance to the content of the White Paper: first, the Red Paper 
emphasized the treaty connection between First Nations people and the federal 
government; second, the Red Paper articulated a model of “self governance” that 
reflected an indigenous perspective.
1
 The model for the latter was reliant on the 
continuance and further maintenance of the treaty relationship with the federal 
government. The Red Paper was generated by mutual cooperation between indigenous 
leaders and members of indigenous communities in Alberta.
2
 The radical difference in 
intent and vision between these two documents became the major catalyst for a changed 
                                                     
1
 Note on terminology: The use of the terms Indian, native, First Nations, aboriginal, and 
indigenous are used in this thesis interchangeably to refer to the original inhabitants of 
Canada. The use of the word “Indian” is used in the context of the period (1968/70). 
Indian is a legal term, such as the Indian Act and, used to describe First Nations people in 
primary source documents of the White Paper and Red Paper. 
2
 Laurie Meijer-Drees, The Indian Association of Alberta: A History of Political Action 
(Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2002). 
2 
relationship between the two parties. This thesis explores the origins in the key concepts 
of treaties and “self-sufficiency” evident in both documents and determines the essence 
of those differences. 
 The federal government’s White Paper3 proposed to deal with the “Indian 
problem” by terminating the legal status of registered Indians thereby “ending” and 
permanently severing all legal responsibility owed to Indian people as embodied in 
existing treaties held with the Crown. In part, the White Paper appeared to be influenced 
by the recommendations found in the 1967 Hawthorn Report, A Survey of the 
Contemporary Indians of Canada: Economic, Political, Educational Needs and Policies, 
in 1967. The Hawthorn Report looked favourably upon extending provincial services for 
Indian people, while at the same time the Report recognized Indians unique legal status 
within the Canadian legal system. That is, the Report defined Indians as “Citizens Plus;” 
which the authors of the Report defined as, “...in addition to the normal rights and duties 
of citizenship, Indians possess certain additional rights as charter members of the 
                                                     
3
 Sally Weaver, “The Hawthorn Report: Its Use in the Making of Canadian Indian 
Policy,” in Noel Dyck, and James B. Waldram, Anthropology, Public Policy and Native 
Peoples in Canada (Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queens University Press, 1993), 75-97. 
Sally Weaver argued that the “Hawthorn Report was not commissioned with the White 
Paper in mind.” However, she stated: “If anthropologists seek to influence the policy-
making process through their research, they must first understand the political and 
bureaucratic nature of governments and how the policy-making process operates within 
that context.” Weaver explained how the Hawthorn Report, which emphasized the 
“special status” of Indian, as “citizens plus,” became quickly politicized with the 1968 
federal election of Pierre Trudeau. The Report did not fit with Trudeau’s philosophy 
against “special” rights for minority groups. In short, the Trudeau administration 
favoured policies that were to be “far sighted, to foresee future change, and to avoid 
creating further problems.” Weaver stated: “Because of this ethos, incremental policies 
were disparaged and fundamental change highly valued. This explains, in part, how the 
exercise to revise the Indian Act turned into an exercise which questioned the foundations 
of the act and produced the 1969 White Paper.” 
3 
Canadian community.”4 However, the Report ostensibly determined that the legal status 
of Indians as defined in the 1867 British North American Act (hereafter, the BNA Act) 
should be abolished, particularly Section 91 (24) of the BNA Act. The Report also 
hypothesized that treaties would have less significance in meeting the future and evolving 
needs of First Nations people. In other words, the Report found that the federal statutes 
pertaining to Indians, such as the Section 91 (24) of the BNA Act, be removed to allow 
First Nations people greater accessibility to provincial services.
5
 Essentially, the 
recommendations of the Report strongly influenced the federal government’s intentions 
as subsequently expressed in the White Paper.  
  Other features of the White Paper seemed to stem from the broader liberal ideas 
advocated by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and, to a lesser extent, by the Minister of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Jean Chrétien. The federal government’s 
White Paper called for the repeal of the Indian Act, the abolishment of the Indian 
Department, and also the transfer of responsibility for Indian’s and all their affairs from 
federal to provincial government. Control of Indian lands, the White Paper also proposed, 
would occur through privatization under a land transfer plan.
6
 As James S. Frideres 
states, “the White Paper outlined a plan by which First Nations would be legally 
eliminated through the repeal of their special status and the end of their unique 
relationship with the federal government, and the treaties would cease to be living 
                                                     
4
 H. B Hawthorn ed. A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada: A Report on 
Economic, Political, Educational Needs and Policies, vol 1, (Ottawa: Indian Affairs 
Branch, 1966), 13. Also known as the Hawthorn Report in Canada. 
5
 Ibid, 240. 
6
 R J. Surtees, Canadian Indian Policy: A Critical Bibliography (Bloomington, Indiana: 
University Press, 1982), 55.  
4 
documents.”7 In response to these proposed changes, native organizations rallied against 
the federal White Paper proposal and were supported by non-native “social, political, and 
religious organizations.”8 The cumulative community and organizational resistance to the 
White Paper ultimately resulted in the government’s official withdrawal of its proposal 
on Indians in 1971.
9
  
 Various Indian organizations from across the country immediately responded to 
the federal White Paper.
10
 In 1970, the Indian Association of Alberta (IAA) produced a 
counter-narrative to the federal White Paper, with the drafting of the Red Paper. The Red 
Paper was adopted by the National Indian Brotherhood as the official response to the 
White Paper.
11
 The Red Paper advocated for the continuance and legal recognition of 
treaty rights that First Nations people signed with the Crown over a century prior to 1970. 
                                                     
7
 James S. Frideres, First Nations in the Twenty-First Century (Don Mills, Ontario: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 15. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, “Resolving Aboriginal Claims - 
A Practical Guide to Canadian Experiences,” http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014174/1100100014179, (website, last accessed 21/9/2014). 
10
 The Union of British Colombia Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) developed the Brown Paper in 
1970, opposing the federal White Paper, and officially titled its document: “A 
Declaration Of Indian Rights: The BC Indian Position Paper.” The Brown Paper focused 
on aboriginal rights and titles, 
http://www.ubcic.bc.ca/files/PDF/1970_11_17_DeclarationOfIndianRightsTheBCIndian
PositionPaper_web_sm.pdf. UBCIC website, (Last access, 13/12/14). The Manitoba 
Indian Chiefs also produced a counter-proposal titled Wahbung, Our Tomorrows. This 
paper was divided into two sections, “Ongoing Relationships” (including treaties) and 
“Development Areas” (including economic development and reserve government). The 
Position Paper was the response to the White Paper from the Iroquois and Allied Indian, 
Brantford, Ontario, 1971. Taken from, Sally Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: 
The Hidden Agenda 1968-1970 (Toronto Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 
204. 
11 
See Sally Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-1970 
(Toronto Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 5; and Laurie Meijer-Drees, The 
Indian Association of Alberta: A History of Political Action (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2002), 169. 
5 
In his prefatory remarks in the Red Paper, Harold Cardinal, then president of the IAA, 
stated, “To us who are Treaty Indians there is nothing more important than our Treaties, 
our lands and the well-being of our future generation.”12 The aim of the counter-proposal 
was to not only reject the federal policy articulated in the White Paper, but also to 
represent an alternative strategy reflective of First Nations people’s needs and aspirations 
for economic development and education, as an effective and grassroots or community 
driven means to reducing poverty and to gain “self-sufficiency.”13  
 In retrospect, these two documents collectively represented two very different 
visions of “self-sufficiency.” The White Paper consistently advocated for the immersion, 
or assimilation, of Indian people into the existing body politic. In the federal model, the 
government assured First Nations people that, once immersed into Canadian society, 
Indians would acquire the same rights, privileges, and freedoms as non-Indians; “society 
structured in a way to enhance individual freedom and to advance the individual the 
means to that freedom.”14 Alternatively, the counter-narrative in the Red Paper, argued 
that indigenous freedom and “self-sufficiency” were inextricably linked to the historical 
treaties. The authors of the Red Paper contended that Indian people signed treaties with 
the Crown as equals, that the treaties were sacred, and that treaties reflected continued 
promises made to the Indian people by the government. Further, the IAA argued that the 
treaties could potentially be “modernized” to meet the needs of treaty Indians of the 
present day and, that treaties remained of lasting and critical important to Indian people. 
                                                     
12
 The Indian Association of Alberta, Citizen Plus: the Red Paper (Edmonton, Alberta: 
reproduced with the permission of the Indian Association of Alberta, 1970), 1. 
13
 Ibid, 4-23.  
14
 See, Anthony Westell, Paradox: Trudeau as Prime Minister (Scarbough, Ontario: 
Prentice Hall of Canada), 358. 
6 
This research explores the differences in views, the political significance, and the 
community opposition with regard to the legal status of Indians, treaties, and lands first as 
proposed in the Canadian federal government’s proposed White Paper on Indian policy 
and second, in the 1970s Red Paper. As result of this comparative analysis, the thesis 
claims that in 1970, the IAA regarded the historical treaties as sacred agreements and yet, 
treaties have not lost relevance for treaty Indian people in contemporary Alberta. This 
thesis is limited to a detailed comparative examination of the 1969White Paper and the 
1970 Red Paper, and does not include an overview of all legal decisions pertaining to 
treaties. The researcher is aware that on-going legal decisions paralleled the discussions 
of the 1969White Paper and the 1970 Red Paper. Several significant decisions and cases 
also influenced government-Indian relations however these are not the focus of my 
discussion. 
Methods 
 One of the primary interpretive methods used in this thesis is discourse analysis.
15
 
While there is no consensus among scholars or across disciplines on the word “discourse” 
most theorists of discourse theory and critical discourse analysis are influenced by Michel 
Foucault’s work (1972) Archaeology of Knowledge.16 Foucault’s use of the term 
“discourse” was consistent within a context of power, knowledge, and truth.17 In this 
                                                     
15
 In using the term “discourse” analysis, I do not claim to know the working of its many 
meanings and interpretation currently in use by many disciplines and theorists who use 
the term across time and space. The meaning and interpretation of discourse theory 
continues to evolve. My use to the term “discourse” is not meant as an exhaustive 
analysis of the term, but rather to use it flexibility to analyze the White Paper in relation 
to the Red Paper. 
16
 Sara Mills, Discourse: the New Critical Idiom (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997), 1-7. 
17
  Sara Mills, Discourse: the New Critical Idiom, 15. 
7 
context, Foucault argued that “discourse” did not exist in a vacuum but that discursive 
speech overlapped with power and knowledge. As a consequence of this overlap, 
knowledge arising from discourse is the result of the effect of power struggles between 
individuals or various constituents in any particular setting.
18
 For instance, as Sara Mills 
points out, if a student seeks to understand the geographic term “India” or “Africa,” using 
the resources of a library catalogue, she or he will find that in the nineteenth century the 
production of knowledge about these countries was primarily produced by British writers 
and coincided with the period of British colonial expansionism.
19
 Therefore as Mills 
demonstrates there exists a concrete connection between the production of knowledge 
and power relations. This is the relationship Foucault describes as “power/knowledge.”20 
Thus, the researcher of this thesis has utilized this concept of Foucault’s overlapping 
relationship of “power/knowledge” to illuminate my understanding of the federal 
production of a statement of policy and proposals identified as the White Paper. The 
White Paper’s rationalization to end indigenous rights, treaties, and “self-sufficiency” for 
Indian people was the discourse being produced by the federal government.  But the 
proposals and policies for assimilation set forth by the White Paper, arose from pre-
existing knowledge on indigenous people in Canada and was produced by Euro-Canadian 
policy-makers, scholars, and writers studying indigenous people for various purposes 
whether political, scholarly or literary, etc…. Historical agreements discussed in this 
chapter such as the 1763 Royal Proclamation, 1867 British North American Act, and the 
1876 Indian Act are prime examples of knowledge produced by the discursive and 
                                                     
18
 Ibid, 19. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
8 
material relations between representatives of the government of Canada and Indian 
people. For example, the Indian Act seriously eroded the power of Indian people with the 
paternalism embedded in the Act. To a large degree, the Indian Act configured and 
disabled Indian identities and agency. However, the powerlessness of the Indian Act also 
represented a tool for Indians to gain some form of freedom and power against the White 
Paper; the Red Paper stated that the whole “spirit” of the Indian Act is paternalistic, but 
the Act provided the legal basis for Indians.
21
 The Canadian state as a knowledge 
producer has possessed the power to finance and support institutions, to staff and 
administer state law, and has in many ways tired to control and define the rights of 
indigenous people.
22
 In essence, the Red Paper which was the counter response to the 
proposals of the White Paper represented a significant expression, or discourse of, 
political resistance, or assertion. The friction that arose between the federal White Paper 
and the IAA Red Paper was a “power struggle” whereby Indians spoke back to the 
dominant narrative of assimilation rationalized by the White Paper. In examining a piece 
of discourse, the researcher must establish, or ask, who are the parties that contribute to 
the conversation? To analyze the discourse on indigenous rights, treaties, and “self-
sufficiency” the researcher asked “who were the contributors”? More importantly, “from 
what perspective were these contributors speaking”? And, “what ideologies were 
employed, and to what end where these ideologies applied”?   
  Foucault’s use of the term “discourse” was complex. His use offers scholars like 
me flexibility. For instance, Foucault described “discourse” as “not root[ed] within a 
broader system of fully worked-out theoretically ideas...but, this lack of system is also 
                                                     
21
 The Indian Association of Alberta Citizen Plus: the Red Paper, 13. 
22
 Ibid. 
9 
what makes for a certain flexibility” to fit changing social and political circumstances.23  
Although Foucault defined “discourse” within the overlapping context of power, 
knowledge, and truth, the flexibility of the term has allowed me to apply “discourse” 
within the context of the indigenous rights, treaties, and “self-sufficiency.” That is, the 
“discourse” on indigenous rights, treaties, and “self-sufficiency” in relation to power and 
knowledge, leaned in favour of the federal White Paper. The federal government, as 
authors of the White Paper possessed the financial means and access to the print and 
broadcast media to disseminate its “authoritative” knowledge of indigenous rights, 
treaties, and “self-sufficiency.” Thus, in my analysis of the discourse of the White and 
Red Paper, “discourse” is a tool to analyze a politically-charged context that arose when 
the federal government and politically alert Indian leadership came face to face when 
both chose to review the broader discourse on indigenous rights, treaties, and “self-
sufficiency.” Essentially, this period in history was marked by the aggressive proposals 
expressed by the federal White Paper to completely assimilate Indian people into 
Canadian society without regard to its responsibilities as evident in the historical treaties 
signed with Indian people. As consequence, the White Paper was resolutely met with 
resistance by the IAA authors of the Red Paper. As the president of the IAA, Harold 
Cardinal stated, “The Liberal government of the day proposed doing away with Indian 
reserves, [Indian] status, and identity. It was, for Indian Nations, literally a question of 
survival.”24  
                                                     
23
 Ibid, 15. 
24
 Harold Cardinal, The Unjust Society, 2
nd
 edition (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 
1999), vii. 
10 
In order for me, as a researcher, to understand the friction that existed between the 
two documents during this critical juncture in history, the uses of discourse analysis has 
allows the researcher to understand what influential ideas and ideals were behind the 
White Paper and Red Paper. Both the White Paper and the Red Paper were political 
claims relative to the respective understandings of the parties about treaty and aboriginal 
rights. The White Paper advocated “ending” the treaty relationship with indigenous 
people in Canada, while the Red Paper argued for the legal recognition and 
implementation of the treaties made with the government. This particular circumstance 
and political conflict in history, as expressed in the contest between the discourses 
produced on one hand by the White Paper and on the other hand by Red Paper, continues 
to have relevance to date, as treaties have not been settled in 2015.  
 The flexibility of the term “discourse” has allowed me as author to analyze the 
discourse that arose in this politically charged debate, as shown in the opposition 
expressed by the IAA’s Red Paper. Sara Mills defines the approach to critical discourse 
analysis in this way: “This group of linguists has developed a political analysis of text 
and . . . they have integrated Michel Foucault’s definition of discourse with a systemic 
framework of analysis based on a linguistic analysis of the text.”25 She explains how 
critical discourse analysts have integrated Foucault’s concepts of discourse to include 
settings or circumstances when political concerns or opposition intensifies: “the way that 
people are positioned into roles through discursive structures, the way that certain 
people’s knowledge is disqualified or is not taken seriously in contrast to authorized 
                                                     
25
 Ibid, 131. 
11 
knowledge.”26 The notion of “authorized knowledge” used in this research is to imply 
that the federal government White Paper represented a vehicle to produce “official 
knowledge” in relation to Indians. The authors of the White Paper argued that treaties 
signed in the last century were not relevant in a modern context. Not only did the White 
Paper conceive that treaties did not meet the needs of Indians, but they suggested that 
treaties were also problematic because, according to their interpretation, only minimal 
promises were made in the original treaties. Therefore, the White Paper proposed, treaties 
should be “ended.”27 In other words, the federal government’s interpretation of the 
treaties may be seen to discursively imply that government alone possesses “authorized 
knowledge.” In the counter argument against treaties as proposed by the federal 
government, the IAA’s understanding of treaties including their significance, value, and 
continued of relevance was correspondingly “disqualified.” Furthermore, the state—
meaning the Canadian federal government—had access to the resources, including 
money and easy access to all forms of media, and was better able to publically articulate 
its position in relation to what they believed the Indians needed.  
Equally important in the discursive environment and structure that gave rise to 
release of the White Paper, is how Indians were portrayed, by many authors including the 
White Paper, as a separate “race” apart from mainstream society.28 Implicitly, the White 
Paper portrayed Indians and their cultures in wholly negative terms that needed to be 
incorporated into dominant white society. Mills explains how critical discourse linguists 
not only describe discursive structures, but deconstruct them to “show how discourse is 
                                                     
26
 Ibid, 133. 
27
 Canada, House of Commons, Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian 
Policy, 1969 (Ottawa: Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1969), 11. 
28
 Ibid, 1. 
12 
shaped by relations of power and ideologies,” and which, in turn, have an effect on 
“social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge” and belief.29   
In the researcher’s view, the White Paper grounded its discourse on indigenous 
rights, treaty and “self-sufficiency” using the concept of the “Just Society.” The “Just 
Society” was based on understanding liberal ideas of individualism, equality, and 
freedom.
30
 Essentially, the “Just Society” borrowed Locke’s and Rousseau’s liberal ideas 
of individualism, equality, and freedom.
31
 The White Paper proposed applying Western 
liberal democratic idea of individualism, equality, and freedom to Indians and by so 
doing, believed the termination of the treaties relationship was essential. These broader 
liberal ideologies provided the central foundation for ideas of the government’s White 
Paper. However, contemporary author, Dale Turner has since shed light on the political, 
rather than purely philosophical, nature of the liberal ideals underlying the federal White 
Paper.
 32
 Specifically, Turner exposed how the broader liberal ideologies– individual, 
equality, and freedom - embedded in the White Paper were the government’s rationale to 
terminate the legal, and collective, status of Indians with the ultimate purpose of 
assimilating Indians into mainstream society. In this respect, the White Paper’s proposal 
revolved around assimilation rather than sovereignty and was continuous with 
Eurocentric ideas of the 19th century.  
                                                     
29
 Sara Mills, Discourse: the New Critical Idiom, 133. 
30
 Thomas S. Axworthy and Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Towards a Just Society (Ontario, 
Canada: Penguin Books, 1990), 263. 
31
 Pierre Trudeau, Against The Current: Selected Writing 1939-1996 (Toronto, Ontario: 
MeClelland & Steward Inc, 1969), 183. 
32
 Dale Turner, This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy 
(Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto, 2006), 13. 
13 
 Turner assisted my understanding of the power dynamics that were ignited with 
the release of the federal White Paper. Turner examines the long history of the 
relationship between the federal government and indigenous people in Canada. He 
employs three key concepts to understand the prevailing discourses of indigenous rights 
in Canada: “‘White Paper,’ ‘Citizens Plus,’ and ‘Minority Rights.’”33 Each of these 
concepts, Turner asserts, is guided by a “particular brand” of liberalism and as such, 
positions indigenous rights within the “larger account of political justice.”34 In other 
words, the three key concepts commonly utilized by federal legislators accommodate 
indigenous people; however, Turner shows how these concepts are not “peace pipes.” Of 
particular significance is Turner’s contention that the 1969 White Paper emphasized 
cultural rather than political status of Indians.
35
 Indeed, this distinction is important, as 
Turner shows, because the IAA, in the Red Paper, repeated their arguments that their 
status as Indians was rooted in the historical treaties.
36
 Thus, the IAA continuously stated 
that treaties were, and remain, political agreements that created an ongoing political 
relationship with the state. 
 The IAA in the Red Paper resisted and challenged the prevailing norms of the 
Western liberal paradigm as it was articulated in the federal White Paper. In order to be 
acknowledged by the Canadian state, the Red Paper necessarily had to incorporate some 
discursive aspects and therefore the vocabulary of the Western paradigm. For instance, 
the IAA used the written word, to speak back to the federal government rather than 
employing what might have been seen as a more traditional approach of oral spoken 
                                                     
33
 Ibid, 5. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid, 22. 
36
 The Indian Association of Alberta, Citizens Plus: the Red Paper, 7. 
14 
response. Nevertheless, the Red Paper responded in writing to the White Paper’s attempt 
to end treaties, creating a well-shaped argument that described the Indian’s understanding 
of treaties and what historical treaties meant to them. Harold Cardinal described the 
importance of treaties against the assertions made by the federal government’s White 
Paper as follows,   
 The new Indian policy promulgated by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s 
 government...is a thinly disguised programme of extermination through 
 assimilation. For the Indian to survive, says the government in effect, he must 
 become a good little brown white man [sic]. The Americans to the south of us 
 used to have a saying: “The only good Indian is a dead Indian,” The MacDonald-
 Chrétien doctrine would amend this but slightly to, “The only good Indian is a 
 non-Indian.”37  
Although Cardinal consistently, and effectively, criticized the government’s White Paper, 
he also explained the discourse of the White Paper, and its effects, on Indian people’s 
“identity.”38 In other words, Cardinal was stating that First Nations discourse on, and 
comprehension of, treaties was equally, if not more, valid and meaningful as those set out 
in the White Paper. 
 The exclusion of Indian people in the consultation process and development of the 
White Paper was also contentious. This dispute was largely due to divergent (or, 
discursively opposed) understandings of the interpretation of “participation,” and how 
“participation” was exercised by the respective parties. Turner states that the consistent 
misunderstanding on this point regarding consultation lays in the meaning of aboriginal 
participation has in the legal and political practices of the state. According to the federal 
government, participation must include aboriginal input. And yet, documents show, 
                                                     
37
 Harold Cardinal, The Unjust Society, 1. Cardinal stated that two ministers were 
responsible for the White Paper: Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 
Jean Chrétien, and Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs, John A. MacDonald.  
38
 Ibid, 14. 
15 
aboriginal people were not consulted in the development of the White Paper.
39
 Although 
Turner’s scholarship focuses primarily on contemporary aboriginal and state relations, I 
believe his analysis is relevant to the political process that occurred from 1969 to 1970. 
Seen this light, the IAA argued that they did not participate in the conceptualization 
stages or development process of the White Paper although the government claimed to 
have consulted.
40
 As the Red Paper asserted, “no treaty Indians asked for any of these 
things and yet through his [Chrétien] concept of “consultation,” the Minister said that his 
White Paper was in response to things said by Indians.”41 Turner contends that the “key 
problem of participation arise because most Aboriginal peoples still believe that their 
ways of understanding the world are, de facto, radically different from Western European 
ways of understanding the world.”42 From 1969 to 1970, these cultural, and discursive, 
differences in “understanding the world” caused tension between “aboriginal ways of 
knowing the world and the legal and political discourse of the state.”43 For example, the 
issue of “equality” meant something different and was interpreted differently by the 
government than by the Indian Chiefs of Alberta. Whereas, the authors of the government 
White Paper focused on equality of the individual, social, economic, and political rights, 
the Indian Chiefs authoring the Red Paper and other public declarations, conceived 
“equality” as nations based on the treaties. Specifically, the divergent interpretation of 
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treaties exemplifies the “radical” and discursive difference between the parties involved. 
The IAA always held the view that the treaties were important and living agreements.
44
 
  Similarly, to define and understand the Red Paper the researcher is inspired by 
the work of legal scholar, John Borrows.
45
 Borrows’ Canada’s Indigenous Constitution 
offers a conceptual framework to understand the indigenous meaning of treaties. Treaties 
were relevant to the Red Paper’s argument that they are “solemn agreements.”46  
Borrows also emphasises the legal value of treaties as fundamental to the relationship 
between the federal government and First Nations people. As he notes, First Nation 
people practiced treaties as a form of governance prior to the arrival of, and after contact 
with Europeans on the new continent.
47
 Borrows’ argument validates what the Red Paper 
had determined about the importance of treaties: that negotiated treaties in Canada stand 
as a testament of nation-to-nation agreements. Specifically, Borrows describes treaties as 
a sacred source.
48
 Interestingly, Borrows suggests that the sacred view of legal traditions 
is also captured in Western legal traditions. He states that Western legal traditions, such 
as common and civil law, derive their source from the “metaphysical,” or are influenced 
by ideas about religion.
49
 In this light, Borrows defines indigenous people of this 
continent as “diverse and their laws flow from many sources.”50 By this statement I think 
Borrows means sources to include laws and protocols which are designed to relate to 
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each other (or other tribes) relative to, and with, the land. The relevance of Borrows’ 
work is that, he reinforces the view early expressed by the IAA in the Red Paper in 1970: 
that the value and importance of treaties have not changed over many decades of changed 
social relations between governing European settlers and Indian people. Borrows’ work 
usefully shows the significance of treaties, in harmony with the IAA’s perspective, as 
“solemn agreements,” and that treaties remain relevant today.   
 The tribes of Treaty 7 in Alberta and represented by the IAA did not see their 
treaty with the Crown, as static nor as residing as a relic of the past as the White Paper 
implied. Rather, the treaty is viewed as a living document, and sacred.
51
 Treaty 7 elders 
“unanimously” agreed that that their treaty with the Crown was a “peace” treaty, and as 
such the elders interpreted the treaty as “sharing” of the land rather than land surrender.52 
Thus, in the context of “sharing,” the researcher situate Borrows’ work as a theoretical 
tool to illuminate the “sacred” view of treaties and, to show the diversity of indigenous 
law that “flow from many sources.” He also refers to the Creation stories of indigenous 
cultures as another form of indigenous law that contain rules and norms to guide us on 
how to live with the world or to overcome conflict.
53
 For instance, in the Blackfoot 
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survival. 
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Creation story the mythical figure “Napi” created the Blackfoot world which includes; 
how people should relate to each other and with other beings (rocks, birds, trees etc).
54
  
 Treaty 7 is important to my thesis because all those governed and represented by 
Treaty 7 were a part of the IAA during the 1970 Red Paper. It is important to situate 
myself within this research project. I am a treaty Indian, whose ancestors signed Treaty 7 
in 1877 with the Crown. The discourse on treaty and indigeneity
55
 and their 
interpretations are important to me. Thus, the researcher positions himself first; as a 
researcher, and second, as a person whose ties are with the Indian Association of Alberta 
with my band affiliation as Siksika (Blackfoot). As such, the interpretation of the 
research materials, primary and secondary sources, are my own. 
Chapter Summaries  
 Chapter One reviews pre-existing literature and addresses themes relevant to the 
White Paper and Red Paper. Themes relevant to this thesis include: the IAA its origins 
and history; the notions of nationalism held by the federal government and by the IAA; 
divergent conceptualizations of treaties, and the continuant relevance of treaties after the 
release of the Red Paper. Chapter Two examines the White Paper in closer detail, 
including the precedent setting Hawthorn Report of 1966; the political and cultural 
history of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, and the Minister of Indian Affairs and North 
Development, Jean Chrétien. The latter analysis determines how Trudeau’s concept of a 
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“Just Society” was understood as the route to bring equality to Indians. Chapter Two also 
explores the varied response to the federal proposed White Paper by the print press, by 
Indian leaders, and by the Anglican Church of Canada. Chapter Three focuses on the 
reactions to the White Paper articulated by the IAA’s Red Paper. The IAA, authors of the 
Red Paper argued that treaties were the foundation of the relationship between the federal 
government and Indian people rather than the federal legislation of the 1876 Indian Act. 
Chapter Four explores governance for Indian people, as advocated by both the parties; 
that chapter determines that the White Paper advocated the mainstream model, while the 
Red Paper advocated for a pre-existing model based on a common interpretations of the 
treaties. 
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Chapter One: Review of Literature 
Introduction 
 In June 1970, the Chiefs of the Indian Association of Alberta (hereafter, the IAA) 
presented a document called Citizens Plus: the Red Paper (hereafter, the Red Paper) to 
the Right Honourable P. E. Trudeau. The Red Paper is the first indigenous-produced 
document that articulates a model of “self-governance” that reflects an indigenous 
perspective.
56
 Further, as a validation of the importance of the treaty relationship with the 
federal government, the visionary concepts in the document were created by indigenous 
leaders and their communities from Alberta.
57
 This review of secondary literature is 
organized around the Red Paper and the Statement of the Federal Government of Canada 
on Indian Policy (1969), (hereafter, the White Paper). This chapter is presented in four 
sections: the early history of the IAA; the White Paper discussion; the Red Paper; and 
the historical treaties. 
Section One explores secondary literature on the Indian Association of Alberta 
(IAA). Secondary literature during this time period on the IAA is sparse, with the 
exception of Laurie Meijer-Drees’s (2002) The Indian Association of Alberta: A History 
of Political Action. The IAA was an important political organization during the inter-war 
and post-wars years in Canada. The membership of the IAA comprised of Alberta Chiefs 
that represented treaty Indians of Alberta and who collectively authored the Red Paper in 
response to the federal White Paper. Meijer-Drees studies the IAA from its inception in 
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1938 to the mid nineteen sixties and explores how they were influenced by farmer’s 
cooperatives, the League of Indians of Canada, and the Métis Association of Alberta in 
the early years of the Association. Although the IAA was a response in part to poor social 
and economic conditions in First Nations communities, their political activism increased 
in the late nineteen sixties. During the post-war years, extremely poor political and social 
conditions fueled First Nation people’s dissatisfaction with the federal government’s 
proposed policy of equality and full citizenship. The federal government’s approach 
triggered the demand for increased economic opportunities and desire for “separation and 
self-determination.”58 
Section Two reviews secondary literature on the federal government’s White 
Paper. Alan C. Cairns (2000) Citizens Plus: Aboriginal People and the Canadian State, 
and Sally Weaver’s (1981) Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-
1970 both examine the White Paper. Cairns, an author who contributed to H. B. 
Hawthorn’s A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada: Economic, Political, 
Education Needs and Policies of 1966-1967 ( hereafter, the Hawthorn Report) reviews 
how Indians were what he called “Citizens,” thus deserving of the standard rights and 
privileges of other non-indigenous Canadian citizens.
59
 Cairns argues that Indians 
deserve “Plus” rights that stem from the relationship struck with Canada’s government in 
treaties.  Weaver discusses the financial expenditures of the federal Department of Indian 
Affairs and the relevance of this increasing expense as a rationale for the policies 
expounded by the White Paper. As she shows, for example, the total expenditures of 
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Indian Affairs jumped from 64.8 million in 1965-1966 to over 165 million in 1968-1969 
just prior to the White Paper.
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Section Three of the literature review discusses Harold Cardinal’s The Unjust 
Society, as his first edition in 1968 directly influenced the authorship and content of the 
Red Paper. Cardinal’s second edition of The Unjust Society published in 1999 did not 
differ much from his first edition of 1968. However, in his revised introduction Cardinal 
discussed how the broader political landscape has moderately shifted. All concerns 
originally addressed in his first edition and in the Red Paper—poverty, unemployment, 
education, community needs—remained the same.  
Section Four of the chapter reviews a small selection of secondary literature on 
the historical treaties negotiated between First Nation people and the Federal Government 
of Canada with a particular emphasis on Treaty 7. As the opening statement of the Red 
Paper claims: “To us who are Treaty Indians there is nothing more important than our 
Treaties, our lands, and the well being of our future generations.”61 My rationale for 
emphasizing secondary literature on Treaty 7 is personal—I am a member of Siksika 
whose land is part of Treaty 7 (1877). Treaty 7 is one of the various numbered treaties 
negotiated from 1871 to 1921. The IAA Chiefs, who authored the Red Paper, came from 
territories covered by three numbered treaties (Treaties 6, 7, and 8); however, for the 
purpose of my review, I will concentrate on First Nation’s perception of Treaty 7 in 
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particular. I discuss Hildebrandt’s, First Rider’s, and Carter’s (1996) The True Spirit and 
Original Intent of Treaty 7. The literature on treaties is relevant to this thesis because 
treaties are the foundation for any political relationship between the federal government 
and First Nation people, and the authors of the Red Paper claimed that treaties, rather 
than legislation like the Indian Act, are the legal foundation of that relationship. Other 
secondary literature I discuss that addresses the importance of the historical treaties, 
including Treaty 7, from a First Nation’s perspective is John Borrows’ (2010) Canada’s 
Indigenous Constitution.  I also review Thomas Isaac’s (2004) Aboriginal Law: 
Commentary, Cases and Materials which provides a legal background to explain how 
treaties are interpreted in the courts.
62
 The inclusion of Isaac’s book is to present a central 
argument on the IAA’s position in 1970 on treaties. That is, the treaties must be 
“binding” and “incorporated” into the Canadian Constitution.63 Finally, I use specific 
entries on the topic of treaty found in Canada’s 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
People (hereafter, the RCAP)
64
 to show how treaties remain relevant to indigenous self-
determination as expressed in the Red Paper. RCAP arose from regional consultations 
with indigenous peoples across the nation with a mandate spanning from 1991 to 1996. 
The full publication was released in 1996 and thus I am reviewing RCAP’s perspectives 
on treaties as a secondary source relevant to my theory that self determination requires 
understanding the importance of the treaties. 
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Section One  
  Laurie Meijer-Drees’ (2002) The Indian Association of Alberta: A History of 
Political Action documented the first three decades of the IAA’s existence during the 
inter-war and post-wars years in Canada. Based on established secondary literature on her 
subject, she examines questions throughout her book relevant to the history of Indian 
political activity. Founded in 1939 by individuals such as John Callihoo and Métis leader 
Malcolm Norris, the IAA was influenced, in part, by the League of Indian Nations of 
Western Canada, United Farmers Association (UFA) and other cooperative political 
organizations, such as the Métis Association of Alberta (MAA). Meijer-Drees contends 
that the founding of the IAA “represented a deliberate break from the league,” 
establishing a “new direction for Indian politics in the Prairie provinces.”65 She describes 
this new direction as “a move towards provincial organization,”66 and was motivated by 
the poor social and economic conditions experienced by many First Nation communities 
in Alberta. However, according to Meijer-Drees, the IAA was also an “organization that 
was concerned, on an everyday level, with treaty rights.”67 In documenting this history of 
Indian political activity of the IAA, Meijer-Drees describes the significant events that 
contributed to the existence and growth of the organization. 
 Meijer Drees also examines the role of non-Indian peoples working within its 
organization such as John Laurie. Laurie, a former school teacher, served as Secretary 
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with the IAA from 1944 until his death in 1959.
68
 Laurie was also influential in gaining 
support from Opposition politicians and community organizations such as the Friends of 
the Indians Society, head-quartered in Edmonton. With her emphasis on Laurie as 
“outside” help, Meijer Drees suggests that the IAA were outward looking in creating a 
rapport with others to help them understand the structures of larger Canadian society.  
Relationships with outsiders is discussed also by Harold Cardinal in his Unjust Society 
who stated that learning the formal structures of Canadian society was the biggest 
challenge to Indian people, and more specifically to leaders of the IAA.  
Finally, Meijer-Drees discusses the relationship between the IAA and both levels 
of government, federal and provincial. As she observes, the Canadian state had responded 
“relatively positively” to the IAA in their dealings and affairs.69  According to Meijer 
Drees, the early history of the IAA was not immune to disagreement in the form of 
internal tensions pertaining to “outside” help, but rather than between IAA leaders, the 
tension stemmed from antagonisms between John Laurie and the membership. During 
this period, the internal tensions reflected in IAA policies around Indian status and equal 
rights. As Meijer-Drees states, “during the first decade of its operation its policies 
vacillated between striving for distinct Aboriginal status and equal rights within Canadian 
society.”70 Meijer-Drees explains the source of the tension stemmed from the differing 
views of non-Indian secretary John Laurie and Indian membership served by the IAA.  
On the one hand, First Nation people were of the view that the IAA was a vehicle for 
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asserting their treaty rights and special status within Canada or as she contends, 
“reaffirming their separateness from the state.”71 On the other hand, Meijer-Drees 
describes Laurie’s views about the IAA as a mechanism for drawing First Nation people 
into Canadian society through active participation with the Canadian government. 
Meijer-Drees does not describe Laurie’s view as favouring assimilation, but from the 
IAA’s perspective, potential assimilation. As a result of the internal tensions, the IAA 
never presented a “harmonized” vision of the political, social, and economic change thus 
showed it needed to better represent and reflect the needs of the Indian communities it 
represented. Meijer Drees’ report of internal disputes between members and leadership of 
the IAA is important to my research because it clearly shows that leadership did not 
always involve agreement on key issues particularly in the early days of the organization. 
Disjunctures in the social relationships existed within the early organization even though 
the Red Paper subsequently became a collective harmonized political assertion. Historian 
John Tobias emphasizes the disjunctures or tensions in his review of Meijer-Drees’ book: 
“Other issues that required more attention include if and how the tension between the 
Blackfoot and the Plains Cree were reconciled, whether the IAA addressed the needs of 
the northern peoples before 1969, and whether the outside influences and their redirection 
of native goals in the 1950s led to the decline in interest in the Association during the 
1960s?”72 Indeed, the above questions by Tobias are essential in understanding the terms 
of the early development of the IAA’s leadership and the IAA as an organization. Of 
particular importance and relevant to this thesis, are the differences or tensions that may 
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have arisen between the Blackfoot and the Cree. In bygone days, the Blackfoot and the 
Cree were enemies long before the IAA came into existence, and it would be interesting 
to read how these differences were mitigated. Unfortunately, Meijer-Drees did not 
describe how these differences between the two groups were ironed out, or how it 
influenced policy decisions.  
Meijer-Drees failed to clarify how the internal tensions between Laurie and IAA 
membership were resolved. Nonetheless, once the internal tensions ceased the 
organization was in a better position to represent a unified voice and vision against the 
federal White Paper of 1969. In drafting the Red Paper, the vision of the IAA, according 
to Meijer-Drees, was to synthesize an assertion of treaty rights while concurrently 
looking for a closer relationship between First Nation people and the Canadian state. 
However, this “conflicted position” by the IAA was clear by June 1970 when the Red 
Paper was published.
73
 She contends the IAA found itself meshed into the Canadian 
political system in “pursuit” of treaty rights in the form of “citizens plus.”74 As a result of 
their stand on treaties and rights, the IAA launched a new, and radical, direction in Indian 
politics in Canada.
75
 That direction saw treaty rights entrenched in the Canadian 
Constitution Act, 1982, and is largely still with us today. That is, the politics between 
aboriginal leadership and the federal government regarding treaties and rights has not 
largely shifted since the defeat of the White Paper in 1970, and the issue around treaty 
and rights are very much relevant in today’s context.  
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 Meijer-Drees used both archival and private collections to investigate and 
interpret IAA history. She covered the early years of the organization between 1939 and 
through to the late 1950s. Archival sources included the early business papers of the 
Association as well as personal papers of several of the key players, such as John Laurie 
Papers, James Gladstone Papers, and IAA supporters housed at the Glenbow Archives in 
Calgary.
76
  She explains that the DIA Records Group 10 (known as RG 10), housed in the 
National Archives of Canada, contained Indian Affairs “correspondence” with the IAA, 
and “gives a good picture of the response of Ottawa bureaucrats to an Aboriginal 
association that demanded Indian Affairs’ accountability.”77 Unfortunately, the collection 
of correspondence between government and IAA history thins out after 1964 and, in 
Meijer Drees’ view, this scarcity of archival materials after this time may be due to the 
decline of IAA activities after this period or government records not yet publicly 
available. The University of Alberta Archives’ houses the Reta Rowan Papers; Meijer-
Drees describes Reta Rowan as a significant figure in a non-aboriginal association, called 
The Friends of the Indian Society. Rowan’s personal papers contain photos and meeting 
minutes with the IAA. Also significant in Meijer Drees’ analysis was the Saskatchewan 
Archives Board’s Historical Records Section which contained oral histories with 
Saskatchewan leaders of the IAA. She did not define nor clarify what she meant by 
“leaders,” or whether the IAA leadership included both Indian and non-Indian leaders of 
Saskatchewan. Equally important to the early years of the IAA are private collections. 
Meijer Drees mentions that some collections are still in “private hands” and only time 
will tell if at all any private collections will ever be filed for public accessibility. At the 
                                                     
76
 The Glenbow Archives houses the “largest collection” of early IAA history. 
77
 Ibid, xxi. 
29 
time of her writing, Hugh Dempsey and Murray Dobbin both made their papers 
accessible to her; she goes on to mention these two collections housed at the Glenbow 
Archives. Meijer-Drees also used photographs to capture IAA members and their 
supporters at various events and functions. The purpose to add photographs to her work 
was to capture “the personal and intimate” side of IAA history, and offers further insight 
into the organization that is “missing in the written record.”78  Also “missing from the 
written record” are aboriginal family records pertaining to the IAA. Meijer-Drees writes 
that “Aboriginal families have a substantial cache of information...however; much of it is 
not widely available.”79  
 In order to reconstruct the history of the IAA, historian Meijer-Drees mines 
theories from two different disciplines: anthropology and history.  Informed by 
anthropologists such as Jean and John Comaroff, and Pierre Clastres and historians 
Natalie Zemon Davis, Lynn Hunt, and Robert Darnton, Meijer-Drees describes how she 
utilized these two disciplines in her own analysis of the IAA. As she precisely 
summarized, “[t]hese authors focused on wide-ranging issues related to processes 
extended through time: relationships between history and culture, social movements, state 
formation and power, and questions of identity and social change.”80 Applying the work 
of historian George G Fox, 
81
 she states that historians, such as Fox, labelled “new” 
history which emphasized “discontinuity,” “ambiguities,” and the “fractured nature of 
events.”82 Similarly, she refers to the theories of Michel Foucault as “initiating this trend” 
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in historical examination as early as the nineteen seventies.
83
 Meijer-Drees couched the 
early history of Indian political activities in the “fractured” nature of events or what she 
terms as “disjunctures.”84 The IAA represented a social movement that the people could 
rally around but the leadership used the IAA to express concerns long held by the people 
about treaties and rights. The IAA is a capsule in time, a mechanism used by Indian 
leaders to formally express their concerns to larger Canadian politicians and society.   
 By relying on theoretical approaches of Jean and John Comaroff, Meijer-Drees 
makes meaningful connections of the disjointed history of the IAA. Comaroff and 
Comaroff theorize that historical social movements are represented to the historian after 
the fact as “disperse fragments within unbounded fields” rather than a “chain of clear-cut 
events.”85 By applying Comaroff and Comaroff’s theoretical approach to reconstruct the 
history of the IAA, Meijer-Drees has anchored the atmosphere of social activity to a 
larger context. That is, she “attempts to link the quotidian roots of the IAA to a larger 
Prairie and Canadian history.”86 Indeed, as her analysis suggests, the history of Indian 
people is intimately linked to the broader Canadian Plains history and it did not exist 
separate or distinct from it. She explains the founding of the IAA was not the start of First 
Nation’s political activity but, “simply represented a new forum within which reserve 
communities could voice some of their concerns.”87 Meijer-Drees, for example, grounded 
her history of the IAA by discussing larger oppressions caused by the Indian Act for 
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instance, the restrictions on mobility that prohibited Indian people from gathering for 
political purposes.  
Section Two  
Alan C. Cairns’ (2000) Citizens Plus: Aboriginal People and the Canadian State, 
is largely a response to the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People 
(RCAP); the latter was released in 1996 and advocated for aboriginal self-determination 
and self-government. Cairns’ central argument is “the language we employ – how we 
describe each other and our relationship – what we define as the goal towards which we 
are heading – is immensely significant.”88 Cairns examines the intellectual and political 
relationship between aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples and proposes the best 
alternative to a constitutional policy that governs state and aboriginal relations in 
Canada.
89
 He focuses the debate on two opposing views, one of “assimilation” and the 
other of aboriginal “parallelism.”90 He rejects both views as “too polarized for our future 
health.”91 Cairns suggests his own view is a “middle ground”92 in the form of “citizens 
plus” that acknowledges cultural difference, where aboriginal people and those 
identifying as non-aboriginal Canadians may co-exist. 
Cairns did not oppose aboriginal and treaty rights, but he contends that “labels 
matter.”93 Belief in the efficacy of assimilation, he observes, died with the defeat of the 
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1969 White Paper. He states, that “[t]he monopoly formerly enjoyed by white voices has 
been eroded...[and that] Aboriginal people now speak for themselves....”94 The assertion 
by Cairns is evident in 1970 with the IAA authorship of their counter proposal entitled 
the Red Paper. Aboriginal people, according to Cairns, were now present in all forms of 
public discourse, including constitutional discussions. The second concept Cairns 
analyzed is parallelism asserting, “the most frequent image of self-chosen Aboriginal 
futures is of parallelism – Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities travelling side by 
side,” whose paths will never touch.95 In other words, parallelism would be interpreted as 
those treaty Indians who signed the historical treaties with the federal government and 
with their own governing institutions, and will live “side by side” in contemporary 
society with non-Indians in Canada, but separately. Cairns spends a good deal of his book 
focused on the latter and questions parallelism’s validity in terms of common ground 
among all Canadians. He equates parallelism with other labels, such as “treaty 
federalism,”  “nation-to-nation,” and “third order of government.”96 He states the nation-
to-nation view recommended by RCAP, “conjures up images of a mini-international 
system[s]”97 only to communicate to each other through the separate nations people 
belong to, that is, either aboriginal or Canadian systems of government. He suggests that 
parallelism “comes at a price.”98 He contends that the price of parallelism is “distance” 
between aboriginal and non-aboriginal people, and also implies that “our [current] 
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relations are community relations, not those of shared citizenship.”99 In other words, 
Cairns did not see parallelism as a useful concept for describing aboriginal/non-
aboriginal relations as it leads to segregation. Indeed, Cairns’ assertion that labels matter 
also holds true in the case of the IAA in that treaties matter. Under the claim for treaties, 
the IAA unified against the White Paper that proposed to end the treaty relationship.  
Cairns employs an alternative view of “citizen plus,” taken from the 1966 
Hawthorn Report on which he was a senior staff author. He states that “citizen plus” lost 
traction, but still has relevance and utility, if only to “serve as the vehicle for a socio-
political theory.”100 He argues that treaty and nation could be adapted to the “positive 
constraints of the citizen’s label,”101 by recognizing differences and similarities between 
aboriginal and non-aboriginal Canadians, including moral obligations to one another. Put 
another way, Cairns believes that aboriginal people should not think of themselves as 
aboriginal, but rather, as beneficiaries of overlapping federal, provincial, and aboriginal 
citizen identities. The “plus”102 Cairns suggests refers to the historical rights ascribed in 
treaties and would accommodate the contemporary treaty negotiations, currently ongoing, 
primarily in British Columbia. 
 Additionally, Cairns compares Canada’s situation with the Australian model 
regarding citizenship and special status of aboriginal people. He explores the Australian 
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context through writings of Peter Read’s “Whose Citizens? Whose Country?”103 and 
Henry Reynolds’ “Sovereignty.”104 According to Cairns, Read argued that “Aboriginal 
people of the 1990s want to be equal citizens and have the rights pertaining to their 
special status as ‘indigenous people.’”105 Reynolds contended that “Aboriginal people 
will have a national loyalty to their Aboriginal First Nation and a civic loyalty to the 
Australian state.”106 Cairns uses the comparative analysis of Australia as a way of 
describing and considering the applicability of that model in the Canadian contexts 
between aboriginal people and the state.  
 Cairns, a retired political scientist, used his vast experience and knowledge to 
advance the constitutional debate between aboriginal people and the Canadian state. To 
reach his conclusions, he examined post-war Canadian Indian policy, reviewed 
contemporary political debates, and findings from the Royal Commission of Aboriginal 
Peoples (or RCAP). In reviewing the above, he advanced his own theory, “citizens plus.” 
The following quote by Cairns is lengthy, but essential to explain his work: “Citizens 
plus,” according to Cairns, “could serve as the vehicle for a socio-political theory and as 
a simplifying label for public consumption that recognizes the Aboriginal difference 
fashioned by history and the continuing desire to resist submergence and also recognizes 
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our need to feel that we belong to each other.”107 “Citizen plus” was a term carried over 
by Cairns from the Hawthorn Report and re-applied to the contemporary context to 
describe the political cross-currents between aboriginal and government relations in 
Canada.  
Although Cairns emphasizes the need for a common Canadian citizenship under 
the banner of “citizens plus,” he fails to address the details of either what “citizen plus” 
would contain or how it should be implemented. The authors of the Red Paper proposed 
differing notions about citizenship based on treaties with the federal government. Several 
arguments made by academic reviewers of Cairns’ book substantiate what the IAA 
leadership had said about citizenship. Cairns for example maintained that citizenship 
would encourage aboriginal people and non-aboriginal peoples to be compassionate and 
understanding to their own, as well as to the other’s, issues in a “common bond.” 
Contesting his claim, Kristen Burnett states that Cairns “refuses to consider the ‘citizen 
plus’ approach as another support for assimilation.”108 She argues that citizenship is 
defined by Cairns as “entirely in terms of Euro-Canadian traditions and values, making 
the words citizen and Canadian synonymous.”109 Therefore, according to Burnett, “an 
Aboriginal identity is something separate or different from a Canadian identity, making 
assimilation a prerequisite for citizenship.”110 The Red Paper similarly argued in relation 
to identity that Indians must see themselves first as Indians and as Canadians second.  
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Second, another reviewer Kristina Fagan notes that the Hawthorn Report, cited by 
Cairns, defined the “plus” as accommodating “the expression and protection of 
diversity.” Cairns on his part, sees the “plus” in terms of “cultural diversity.”111 In other 
words, Cairns emphasized aboriginal culture, “not on the principle of native 
nationhood.”112 Similarly, the IAA did not view treaties in the context of culture, as 
Cairns suggested. Rather the IAA interpreted the “plus” as those rights signed in treaties 
with the federal government.   
Lastly, sociologist Michael Murphy
113
 also critiques Cairns’ concept of treaties 
and citizenship and broadly speaking, sovereignty.
114
 Murphy contends Cairns does not 
discuss the question of indigenous sovereignty prior to contact.
115
 Murphy argues that 
Cairns “conflates the normative with the empirical” in his analysis of aboriginal 
nationalism. In other words, Murray suggests that Cairns’ position is that Canada has 
successfully asserted its sovereignty over indigenous people due to the “relative 
weakness and dependency” of aboriginal people, and the “increasing interpenetration”116 
of both indigenous and non-indigenous societies. According to Murray, aboriginal 
nationalism “tells us why we should do something, not what we should do.”117 Murray 
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speaks to the normative dimension of aboriginal nationalism, a concept largely left 
untouched by Cairns but important to the IAA leadership. For example, the IAA’s Red 
Paper discussed why the treaties are “worthy of our attention, and why it [treaties] differs 
from other claims, such as those of cultural or religious minorities.”118 Indeed, the IAA 
leadership did not see the treaties as a cultural expression of a minority group, but as 
nation agreements signed with the federal government.  
 Cairns employs Royal Commissions, government reports, and comparative 
analysis to interpret and explore constitutional relations between aboriginal people and 
the Canadian State. He relies largely on the 1996 RCAP to interpret and analyze the 
significance of the concept of “citizens plus.” RCAP’s final report provides the 
foundation or the interpretative framework to analyze the book. Government reports he 
used include excerpts of the 1966 Hawthorn Report, and the 1983 Penner Report. The 
Hawthorn Report was used by Cairns to amplify the concept of “citizens plus” and apply 
the concept to contemporary settings. Cairns admits that “citizens plus” “may have had 
its day” in Canada, but the concept remains a “better fit with our [current] realities.”119 
“Citizens plus,” according to Cairns, originally applied to status First Nation people, but 
is “capable of extension”120 to accommodate the Inuit and the Métis. Cairns also refers to 
the Penner Report on aboriginal self-government, as a counter narrative that promotes 
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“otherness,”121 rather than highlighting similarities or what unites aboriginal and non-
aboriginal Canadians.  
 Weaver’s (1981) Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-
1970, examines federal government policy, and more specifically, policy-making, in 
relation to Indian people during the development of the 1969 White Paper. Weaver asks 
two questions around policy-making and minority groups in relation to the White Paper; 
first, Weaver attempts to show how the government applied participatory democracy to a 
“disadvantaged minority” group; second, she illustrates the challenge for policy-makers 
in applying Canadian political values to a minority group.
122
  Central to her book, in 
particular, is how the White Paper on Indian policy was developed. According to 
Weaver, the federal government’s 1969 White Paper on Indian policy would have 
eliminated the special status of Indians, including the Indian Act, and terminated the 
historical treaty relationship between aboriginal people and Canada. 
 Weaver identifies the Trudeau administration as the principal actor in the drafting 
of the White Paper, including ministers, senior bureaucrats, and civil servants from the 
department of Indian Affairs and North Development (DIAND). The Trudeau 
administration hoped to eliminate the “Indian problem” by instituting their own policies 
of “equality” on Indians. The “Indian problem,” according to Weaver, was described as 
“many social problems”123 plaguing native communities, and moreover, the “problem” 
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existed for many decades before it was “shaped in to a political issue.”124 In part, the 
“Indian problem” could be linked to the Indian Act. Weaver contends that governmental 
policies since the 1830s were always designed to terminate the special status of 
Indians.
125
 In short, Weaver contends by examining the development of the White Paper 
proposal the root cause (barrier to economic progress) was special rights, and equality 
was a “key ingredient”126 in the federal government’s proposal to rectify the “Indian 
problem.” However, principal players were often at odds with the interpretation of key 
terms essential to the success of the proposed White Paper. 
 As Weaver explains, ideologies and personalities among the federal bureaucrats 
diverged. They held differing views on key terms and concepts during the development 
of the White Paper. Terms like “non-discrimination,” “equality,” “aboriginal rights,” and 
“policy” were interpreted differently by different policy- makers.127 For example, she 
says that the term “policy” for some policy-makers meant a “formal statement prepared 
by government;”128 for others, policy meant a “process of negotiating between 
government and Indians”129 on an acceptable agreed upon decision. Personality 
differences also existed among the bureaucracy and the elected officials, according to 
Weaver, involving a mix of “personalities,” “personal career motivations,” and “career 
histories.”130 This is an important assessment by Weaver, as it may have also added to the 
differing views and expectations of various policy-makers. Different ideologies and 
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varying views among bureaucrats may have also added to the lack of “corporate 
memory” of the bureaucracy. Weaver defines “corporate memory”131 as, the “collective 
experience”132 within a portfolio. She found that ministers and civil servants departing 
from the portfolio often take with them their “individual experience.”133 As a 
consequence, “the collective experience is not synthesized and lessons from even the 
recent past remain unlearned”134 This lack of collective experience in portfolios often 
reflected in government policy pertaining to Indians, which often creates a sense of “déjà 
vu”135 for both Indians and government employees. Weaver’s findings are significant in 
relation to the IAA leadership’s concept of self-determination, as defined and articulated 
in the Red Paper. Specifically, her understanding of the need for corporate memory is 
especially significant in relation to the historical treaties as treaties continue to be in the 
hearts and minds of Indian people.  
 Her use of interviews and government files allowed Weaver to construct and 
interpret the history of the White Paper in both initial and final stages. She interviewed 
51 individuals including civil servants and two ministers (Minister of Indian Affairs, Jean 
Chretien and Minister without a Portfolio, Robert K. Andras); thirty one of these 
individuals were originally involved in its development.
136
 The use of government files or 
the official records, allowed her to access “formal arguments”137 during the policy 
formulation process. Her cross reference of interviews in relation to the documents was 
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two-fold. First, as she explains, the interviews “provided necessary data on the unofficial 
arguments and events.”138 Second, the interviews also provided a form of interpretation 
of the documents. As she describes it, “[t]he interviews also allowed me to decide 
whether the documents’ contents were, in fact, the substance of the arguments or whether 
they were, in addition, ‘strategy statements’ designed to elicit responses other than the 
contents might suggest.”139 Weaver’s observation is an important part of her approach, as 
it may help others understand the many different arguments by bureaucrats designed 
specifically to get public reaction on the favourability on certain policy directions. In 
other words, if one policy argument is not suitable and acceptable to the Canadian public, 
then another may be tested. Weaver did not interview Indian leaders, but instead used 
their published accounts to cross reference, “clarify,” or “confirm certain events.”140  
 Weaver applied the broader theoretical framework of social science to reconstruct 
the policy making process of the federal government’s White Paper on Indian policy. 
Specifically, Weaver used applied anthropology to reconstruct legal documents 
pertaining to the White Paper. Applied anthropology is the aspect of anthropology that 
serves practical community or organizational needs.
141
 She states that “meaningful socio-
cultural change can occur without the direct participation of, and compromise by, the 
persons and communities undergoing change.”142 Indeed, as Weaver shows, the IAA 
leadership feared an abrupt change would have had significant impacts in native 
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communities, if the federal White Paper had been implemented. The first paragraph of 
the Red Paper reflected on the White Paper’s proposed elimination of reserves, “with no 
land and consequently the future generation would be condemned to the despair and ugly 
spectre of urban poverty in ghettos.”143 Indeed, proper consultation or some form of 
advocacy by the federal government in their design of the White Paper proposal may 
have gone a long way with Indian leadership. The IAA leadership were more than an 
advocacy group; they were also holding the government to account for the treaties. Thus, 
treaties provided the foundation for the Red Paper, which advocated for treaty rights. 
Harold Cardinal was a central figure in the authorship of the counter-proposal.   
Section Three 
 The Unjust Society by Harold Cardinal was first published in 1969 in response to 
the federal government’s White Paper that proposed to eliminate special status of 
Indians, abolish the Department of Indian Affairs, repeal the Indian Act, and end 
historical treaties. Cardinal discusses the historical injustices against First Nation people 
by the federal government and the rise of native activism starting in the late 1960s. In his 
second edition (1999), only the introduction is revised to include “judicial”144 and 
“political”145 changes that have occurred since the first edition. The actors continue to be 
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the government and aboriginal people. He states “[m]uch has happened since then, 
though how much has really changed remains open to question.”146 
 In Cardinal’s revised introduction, some of the significant political and judicial 
changes that have occurred in the last thirty years, since his first edition are outlined. 
Cardinal observes “discernable”147 changes in the political landscape since the late 1960s 
citing the entrenchment of aboriginal and treaty rights in the Constitution Act, 1982. He 
states that unfortunately the constitutional recognition of aboriginal peoples rights are 
“promises yet to be fulfilled.”148 For example, Cardinal describes the events of the 1990s 
between aboriginal people and the state in particular, the 1990 Oka Crisis and the 1995 
Gustafsen Lake incident in British Columbia. He explains the events of the ‘90s 
“demonstrate how dangerously close to the edge the state of Indian/White relations in 
Canada”149 really was. Aside from the political developments, Cardinal briefly mentions 
that the social injustices against aboriginal people in Canada continue, despite the 
numerous commissions, inquiries, and government reports, such as the 1991 Manitoba 
Aboriginal Justice Inquiry, the constitutional conference beginning in 1983, and the 1996 
RCAP. Unfortunately, according to Cardinal, “at the core, the issues this book identified 
in the late 1960s are issues still unresolved today.”150 These issues are often intertwined 
historically, culturally, socially, politically, and judicially.  
 Cardinal contends that advancements in judicial rulings regarding aboriginal 
rights have gained some recognition in the Canadian legal system, and consequently, had 
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an impact in federal Indian policy. Cardinal identifies two events that forever altered 
aboriginal/government relations in Canada. He discusses the significant impact of the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 1973 Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General) in which three of the justices were in favour of, and three were opposed to, the 
existence of aboriginal title in British Columbia. The second significant event involved 
the James Bay Cree, of Northern Quebec. According to Cardinal, the James Bay Cree had 
“succeeded through litigation”151 in forcing both the provincial government and Hydro 
Quebec to the negotiating table. The Cree were victorious in having their interests 
addressed with the conclusion of the Hydro Quebec project in 1975. Collectively, these 
two events caused the Trudeau government to implement a comprehensive claims policy 
aimed at First Nation people that had not negotiated a treaty. Subsequently, the 
comprehensive claims policy evolved to include the “modern-day [t]reaties”152 in 
Canada. In regards to the judiciary, other than the legal recognition of aboriginal rights in 
Canada, the historical treaties “have not advanced much beyond the confines of the 1969 
White Paper,”153 according to Cardinal. He contends that there is still a “deep spiritual 
feeling attached to [t]reaties...and embedded in the psyche of First Nations Elders.”154 
This deeply committed stance to treaty was evident in the Red Paper, and continues for 
Cardinal. He suggested that treaties can be implemented if the political and legal 
communities in Canada are open to discussing the recommendations proposed by RCAP. 
Cardinal states that RCAP “include[d] some useful recommendations which could serve 
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to ground a political and legal initiative”155 for current governments in relation to 
aboriginal people in Canada. 
 Cardinal identifies “identity,” “the residential schools,” “education,” “economic 
development,” and “leadership” as issues that have changed dramatically over the last 
thirty years.
156
 Although the issues identified above are important in regards to aboriginal 
people, for the purposes of this project, education, economic development, and leadership 
will be examined. In terms of education, Cardinal attests that this is the one area that “real 
and measureable” changes have occurred. He refers to policies aimed at greater control 
by First Nation educational authorities, which have resulted in increased educational 
attainment, particularly at the post-secondary level. However, he stated that First Nation 
students may not have reached “equivalency with the general population,” but when 
“viewed from the last thirty years [this] is nothing less than astronomical.”157  His 
outlook is also positive regarding the economic sector as well. He explains with new 
government initiatives, First Nation and the private sector have “demonstrated that 
economic progress by First Nation’s people is not only possible but achievable.”158 
Cardinal explains part of the solution leading to the economic success of First Nation 
people, are aboriginal financial institutions, and agreements in revenue sharing initiatives 
with provincial governments. For example, he describes the revenue sharing initiative 
between the provincial government of Saskatchewan and the Federation of Saskatchewan 
Indian Nations on gambling. However, he states that more improvements can be made in 
the economic area, as many aboriginal communities are still “excluded from participating 
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in and benefiting from resource development activities in their traditional territories.”159 
Cardinal’s description of revenue sharing initiatives echoed those initiatives described in 
the Red Paper over thirty years ago, when he was in leadership.  
 Cardinal describes how contemporary aboriginal leadership that has changed in 
both its aim and structure, from its predecessors of the 1960s. He explained that the 
aboriginal leadership and its federal and provincial affiliates once focused their aims at 
securing individual rights for Indian people, and now their aim is securing “collective 
rights.”160 The native organizations’ structures have also changed. He states that the older 
aboriginal organizations once had similar structures to those of “labour unions and civil 
rights organizations;” now, however, their contemporaries, such as the Assembly of First 
Nations, describe themselves as nations.
161
 Cardinal contends that the new structure 
better enables the “collective orientation” of First Nation leaders to move the 
“Canadian/Aboriginal political dialogue to a new level.”162 Additionally, Cardinal 
attested that the new collective orientation of leadership better “reflects a perspective 
long advanced by traditional peoples from all the Indian Nations.”163 Cardinal described 
the importance of this new model of leadership structure, as representing and pursuing 
collective rights rather than individual rights, as he was accustomed to with the IAA. 
Nevertheless, the new model in leadership structure has allowed contemporary leaders to 
continue to advance their cause regarding treaties, as they did with the IAA organization 
during the inter-war and post-war years in Canada.  
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  Cardinal primarily used government reports to reconstruct and interpret the 
political landscape of aboriginal and federal government relations in Canada. Even 
though the primary sources used are outdated, they still have relevancy today, such as the 
1966 Hawthorn Report. Government reports and documentation included New Directions 
in Indian Affairs,
164
 Indians and the Law,
165
 and various copies of the amended Indian 
Act, including reports of the consultation meeting on the 1968 Indian Act. In his second 
edition no additional primary or secondary sources were used. 
 The theoretical framework employed by Cardinal was derived from a unique 
combination of his law background and his traditional knowledge taught by the Cree 
elders, whether formal or informal. He states, “I offer my special gratitude to the many 
elders whose views...helped shape my thinking.”166 On a formal level, his experience, 
activism, and writing reflected the work of Rosalie H. Wax and Robert K. Thomas’ 
American Indians and White People.
167
 Cardinal relied largely on his personal experience 
to reconstruct the leadership of IAA during the turbulent years prior to the Red Paper’s 
development in the late 1960s. Cardinal cites the work of Wax and Thomas, but did not 
explicitly state its relevance to his own work. Despite this, the similarities in both 
countries regarding race, culture, and politics were striking during that time period. Also 
important is the role of the Indian Affairs Branch in relation to the lives they affected. 
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 Historian Anthony Fisher reviews both Cardinal’s book and Edgar S. Cahn’s Our 
Brother’s Keeper: The Indian in White America, and describes these two books as the 
“polemical indictments” of both countries’ “mismanagement and malfeasance” of Indian 
Affairs.
168
 Fisher  further describes both books as the best attempt to get these 
departments (Indian Affairs in Canada and the United States) “out in the open”169 where 
social scientists may analyse them in relation to the lives of the indigenous people they 
affected. Broadly speaking, the lives and identities of indigenous people are linked to, 
and derived from, the existence of the Indian Affairs Branch. The IAA leadership was 
aware of this linkage with the Indian Affairs Branch, but they had to carefully balance 
their identities as status Indians with their tribal identities. In other words, the Red Paper 
identified Indians as treaty Indians, rather than status Indians, under the Indian Act.  
Section Four 
 As stated in my introduction, Section Four reviews a small selection of secondary 
literature on the historical treaties negotiated between First Nation people and the Federal 
Government of Canada, with a particular emphasis on Treaty 7. The purpose of this 
section is primarily to understand the arguments of the Red Paper. It is apparent that the 
treaties were the foundation of the 1970s Red Paper document. Thus, the counter-
proposal focused on education and economic development as strategies for self-
sufficiency. The following secondary source literature is post-Red Paper, and although 
the literature is recent, their arguments are relevant to the Red Paper. In other words, the 
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secondary source literature on treaties validates the IAA’s contention in 1970 that treaties 
were important to First Nation people and continues to be important today. 
 Treaty 7 Tribal Council with Walter Hildebrandt, Dorothy First Rider, and Sarah 
Carter (1996) The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7 interviewed various elders 
and gathered their collective memories to examine Treaty 7 using oral histories.
170
 Over 
eighty elders representing five First Nation communities – Kainai (Bloods), Siksika 
(Blackfoot), Pikani (Peigan), Tsuu T’ina (Sarcee), and Stoney – recount their memories 
of the events of Treaty 7, collected during two separate occasions: in the 1970s, and in 
the 1980s. The elders contend that Treaty 7 was a “peace treaty”171 rather than a land 
surrender. According to the elders, their ancestors agreed to “share the land”172 with the 
new arrivals in exchange for certain treaty promises, such as education, medical care, and 
reserves.
173
 However, the original signatories of the treaties had not contemplated the 
differing contemporary views of treaty interpretation that would play a prominent role in 
future negotiations.  
 Generally, the book is an historical overview of Treaty 7, inclusive of an analysis 
of secondary source literature on treaties. The prominent themes of the book are the 
“different agendas,” “different languages,” and “different world views”174 of Treaty 7. 
These themes are important in the context of Treaty 7 from a First Nation’s perspective. 
Chief Roy Whitney, of the Tsuu T’ina Nation, wrote the preface of the book. He contends 
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that the Canadian officials were more than willing to sign a treaty with the First Nation 
people of Southern Alberta for a number of reasons.
175
 The reasons why Canadian 
officials wanted to sign Treaty 7 were three-fold. First, the prospect of American tribes 
settling in Canada was seen as a threat to European settlement.
176
 For example, the Sioux 
and the Nez Perce had fought successfully against the U.S Army and were seeking refuge 
in Canada. Second, the Blackfoot had had less contact with fur traders or missionaries 
before 1870 and thus were seen by state authorities as “volatile” and “unpredictable.”177 
Finally, traders and missionaries pressured Canadian officials to sign a treaty with First 
Nation people as soon as possible, to pave the way for peaceful settlement.
178
  
 The different worldviews and languages of the parties involved shaped the 
interpretation of the treaties, and specifically Treaty 7. Chief Whitney stresses that 
aboriginal languages may lose their meaning when translated into another language such 
as English. For example, “meanings may not be accurately conveyed where there are no 
Blackfoot, Nakota, and Tsuu T’ina words that correspond to English words or 
concepts.”179 According to Whitney, to understand First Nation languages one must 
understand the “context and environment”180 in which they were created. He states, for 
example, that “verb-centred” First Nation and “noun-centred” English languages of 
Treaty 7 “arose out of radically different contexts and environments.”181 Whitney attests 
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that First Nation languages embody a worldview that differs from the European. He 
claims that the Treaty 7 text does not convey First Nation interpretation of treaty.  
 The Treaty 7 book is divided into three parts and utilizes oral interviews, and 
primary and secondary sources. Over eighty oral interviews were conducted from the five 
First Nation communities that signed Treaty 7. Generally, the topics and issues discussed 
in interviews encompassed a broad range of “social, political, and religious beliefs of 
each nation.”182 Part Two draws on archival documents, government reports, and 
secondary sources to reconstruct the narratives leading up to Treaty 7. Archival sources 
used were from the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa (Hayter Reed Papers) and 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (Deputy Superintendent’s Letterbook), The 
Provincial Archives of Alberta (Oblates de Marie Immaculate, Lacombe Papers, and 
Scollen Papers), The Provincial Archives of Manitoba (MG Alexander Morris Papers), 
The Saskatchewan Archives Board (Reverend J.A. Mackay Papers and Laird Papers), and 
the Hudson’s Bay Company Archives in Winnipeg. Also used were Indian Affairs annual 
reports, Sessional Papers from Ottawa, and the North-West Mounted Police reports. In 
addition, secondary source literature such as the works of John Taylor, John Tobias, and 
Jean Friesen was used to analyze treaties, and specifically Treaty 7. According to Chief 
Whitney, scholars agree with oral testimony “that a land surrender was never 
discussed”183 during treaty negotiations over a century ago. 
 The theoretical approach used by the authors to reconstruct the history of treaty 
making in Southern Alberta blend oral history and oral tradition. Oral history is defined 
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as the passing of information from one generation to the next.
184
 Historians and co-
authors Hildebrandt and Carter show that the collective memories of the Treaty 7 elders 
“provide[d] unique insights into a crucial historical event and the complex ways of the 
Aboriginal people.”185 However, the authors do not distinguish between the first group of 
elders interviewed in the 1970s and the second group interviewed in the 1980s. As John 
F. Leslie states, the first group of elders interviewed “would have more intrinsic value 
than the testimony of the second group who did not possess first-hand knowledge of 
events.”186 Nevertheless, the oral testimony of all First Nation elders who participated 
provided a forum to address their concerns to the broader society, and to tell their story 
from a First Nation’s perspective. This source is especially relevant to this study, because 
oral histories of elders validate what the IAA leadership had argued in 1970 in the Red 
Paper: that treaty remains important to First Nation people.  
  Indigenous scholar John Borrows, in his book Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, 
contends that the Canadian legal system is incomplete without recognition and 
acceptance of indigenous treaties.
187
 He emphasises the legal value of treaties as 
fundamental to the relationship between the federal government and First Nation people. 
He contends that “the continuation of treaty rights and obligations entrenches the 
continued existence of Indigenous legal traditions in Canada.”188 Borrows’ argument 
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validates what the Red Paper had determined about the importance of treaties: negotiated 
treaties in Canada are a testament of nation-to-nation agreements.  
 Borrows consults a range of scholarly material, incorporating jurisprudence, 
legislation, constitutional documents, history, and oral tradition. Trevor Shishkin claims 
that Borrows’ work is paramount in the broader “inter-societal dialogue whereby diverse 
but connected peoples can resolve disputes and organize affairs in ways that best reflect 
fundamental principles of justice and equality.”189 “Inter-societal dialogue” is a 
fundamental ingredient needed for the advancement of justice and equality in relation to 
aboriginal people and the larger Canadian society. In 1969, the federal government’s 
White Paper was largely devoid of this inter-societal dialogue with First Nation people. 
The IAA, on its part, had an internal dialogue with its membership to produce a counter 
proposal, the Red Paper, with education and economic development as proposed 
strategies.   
 John Borrows is a Professor and Law Foundation Chair in Aboriginal Justice in 
the faculty of Law at the University of Victoria and Robina Professor in Law and Public 
Policy at the University of Minnesota Law School. His analysis describes the structures 
of Canadian law in relation to aboriginal people. Inspired by the work of Michel 
Foucault, Borrows provides a “historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us [in 
Canadian law] while at the same time experiment[ing] with the possibility of going 
beyond them.”190 He contends that he is not trying to dissolve the relations of power: that 
is, the current political relationship between the federal government and First Nation 
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people. Rather, Borrows suggests an alternative that would “give oneself the rules of, the 
techniques of management, and the ethics, the ethos, that practice of the self, which 
would allow these games of power [in relation to Indigenous peoples in Canada] to be 
played with a minimum of domination.”191 Borrows’ argument is particularly relevant to 
this thesis because he provides a new or unique perspective that did not exist in 1970, a 
time when the voices of First Nation people were largely silenced in the halls of 
Parliament. The federal White Paper was a testament of the “games of power” which, as 
Borrows implies, involved not a “minimum of domination,” but a complete domination. 
In other words, the White Paper was the product of a dominant foreign government that 
was alien to indigenous values of governance and that imposed its ideals and values on a 
minority group. Although Borrows’ arguments about treaties are contemporary and were 
thus absent during the development of the Red Paper, his contemporary interpretation of 
the legal recognition of treaties is useful for a retrospective analysis of the Red Paper. 
Moreover, unlike in 1970, treaties today have Constitutional protection. 
 Thomas Isaac’s Aboriginal Law: Commentary, Cases and Materials reviews the 
“major themes that have developed in Canadian Aboriginal law”192 over the last two 
centuries. Some of the major themes that Isaac discusses include the recognition of 
aboriginal and treaty rights in the Constitution Act, 1982; the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
(SCC) decision on the “constitutional recognition and affirmation of existing Aboriginal 
and treaty rights”193; and the “Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate”194 when any 
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act of Parliament infringes on existing aboriginal and treaty rights. Isaac explains that the 
process of defining aboriginal and treaty rights at the SCC is “extremely complex” and 
usually involves oral and historical evidence.
195
 He states that “[r]ecognizing that 
Aboriginal law forms a part of broader Canadian law provides guidance in respect for 
future issues” 196 in the relationship between aboriginal people and the federal 
government. Chapter Two of his book, “Treaty Rights” (which includes post-
confederation treaties) reviews the “sui generis” nature of treaties and the court’s 
interpretation of treaty rights today. The Supreme Court of Canada has defined treaties as 
sui generis, in that they are “neither international-like agreements between nation-states, 
nor are they simple contracts.”197 The Supreme Court ruling on the nature of Indian 
treaties was derived mainly from R. v. Simon (1985), and R. v. Sioui (1990).
198
 Prior to 
the court’s ruling on the nature of Indian treaties, the interpretation by both government 
and First Nation leaders varied on the significance and meaning of treaties.
199
 On the one 
hand, Canadian governments have historically viewed Indian treaties and aboriginal 
people from a “positivist, literal perspective,” 200 according to Isaac. On the other hand, 
many aboriginal people see treaties as “sacred.”201 The interpretation on the nature of 
treaties by the SCC as sui generis is relevant to this thesis project, because treaties during 
the Red Paper era were largely absent from the legal debate in Canada. Additionally, 
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Isaac’s arguments about treaties also confirm the arguments put forth by the IAA 
leadership that treaties were central to First Nation people.  
 Isaac’s method of analyzing aboriginal law in Canada over the last two centuries, 
and in particular post-1982, is to review Supreme Court decisions on aboriginal rights 
and title, treaty rights, and the Constitution Act of 1982. In addition to the numerous SCC 
rulings, each chapter is supplemented with “Case and Materials” relevant to the topic. 
Additionally, the book includes detailed maps showing the boundary lines of the 
historical treaties, modern treaties, and land claims agreements in Canada. However, 
Isaac did not touch on issues of justice, “Aboriginal customary law, international law, and 
the Indian Act.”202 
 In his analysis, Isaac uses Supreme Court of Canada decisions such as the 1990 
R.v. Sparrow, Delgamuukw v. BC, 1999 R. v. Marshall, and 2001 Mitchell v. Min. Of Nat. 
Revenue to demonstrate the continuing evolution of aboriginal law in Canada. Isaac 
explains aboriginal law’s evolution over the last two decades in this way: “it [aboriginal 
law] has developed within the context of existing Canadian constitutional law and Anglo-
Canadian common law.”203  Although he observes uncertainty in Canadian aboriginal 
law, he is adamant that Canadian common law provides a “solid base to understand and 
interpret the meaning of section 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.”204 Within the 
context of the Canadian justice system, Isaac describes how some court decisions, such as 
R. v. Sparrow, R.v. Delgamuukw, and R. v. Marshall, “seem to support solutions” 
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between the Crown and First Nation people that are “negotiated, practical, and fair.”205 
The contemporary court solutions that are “negotiated, practical, and fair” were non-
existent in Canadian courts in 1970. However, with the defeat of the White Paper, the 
IAA played a significant role in “encouraging and fostering”206 a conversation with the 
federal government about treaty and treaty rights, and indirectly RCAP. 
 Evidence gathered on The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) was 
published in 1996. In 1991, the Commission received its mandate to investigate issues 
affecting the lives of aboriginal people in Canada relative to that of non-aboriginal 
Canadians. Issues included historical, political, economical, social, and judicial matters 
and, more generally, “their [First Nation people’s] situation in Canada.”207 The final 
report consisted of over 3,500 pages in five volumes, costing around $58 million, and 
was one of the most expensive Royal Commissions in Canadian history.
208
 The purpose 
of the inclusion of RCAP in this thesis project is to illustrate the relevance of treaties to 
indigenous self-determination as implied in the Red Paper, discussed in Chapter Three of 
my thesis. Volume 2, Part One and Two of the RCAP are particularly relevant to the Red 
Paper’s argument that self determination requires an understanding of the importance of 
the treaties to First Nation people. 
 Although the term “nation-to-nation” was never used in the Red Paper, its 
creators knew the importance of treaty, which encompassed all First Nation people’s 
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rights and status as Indian people. The nation-to-nation concept was certainly implied. 
RCAP similarly affirmed the recognition of a nation-to-nation approach based on the 
treaties.
209
 In part, RCAP’s mandate was to review the treaty relationship with the Crown 
and to determine its contemporary relevance. The Commission found that treaties were 
important to First Nation people. RCAP’s findings validate Cardinal’s view on the 
importance of treaties. The opening statement of RCAP captures this nation-to-nation 
perspective. 
 When our peoples entered into treaties, there were nations of peoples...Because 
 only nations can enter into treaties. Our peoples, prior to the arrival of the non-
 indigenous peoples, were under a single political society. They had their own 
 languages. They had their own spiritual beliefs. They had their own political 
 institutions. They had the land base, and they possessed historic continuity on this 
 land base. 
 Within these structures, they were able to enter into treaties amongst themselves 
 as different tribes, as different nations on this land. In that capacity they entered 
 into treaty with the British people. So, these treaties were entered into on a nation-
 to-nation basis. That treaty set out for us what our relationship will be with the 
 British Crown and her successive governments.
210
 
 
The nation-to-nation approach conveyed by RCAP was understood as a continuing 
obligation by First Nation leadership and the Queen’s representatives. More importantly, 
RCAP’s view of a nation-to-nation approach stems from the historic agreements between 
aboriginal people and the Crown: “The parties to the treaties must be recognized as 
nations, not merely as ‘sections of society.’”211 This assertion is significant to my 
research because the IAA leadership argued that First Nation people were more than 
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sections of society, but “citizens plus.” That is, the rights and privileges ascribed to First 
Nation peoples in the historical treaties.  
Conclusion 
 The secondary sources discussed in this chapter serve to introduce Chapter Two, 
which will analyze the White Paper as primary source to show the history of leadership 
and model of governance. Specifically, Chapter Two examines the White Paper in closer 
detail, drawing on themes central to its document. For example, participatory democracy 
was an idea central to Trudeau’s election platform in 1968, which saw the Liberal party 
form the federal government. What is participatory democracy? How did participatory 
democracy relate to Indian people? And, how did Indian participate in making the White 
Paper? Also, how did the Indian leadership reacted or respond to the federal initiative? 
These questions will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Two – The Federal Perspective: The “End” of Indians 
Introduction   
 This chapter assembles primary source documentation, including policy 
documents, newspaper accounts, government documents and selected speeches, to 
analyze the underlying intent of the 1969 Statement of the Government of Canada on 
Indian Policy (hereafter, the White Paper). This chapter examines the White Paper as 
representative of the perspective of the federal government to deal with the “Indian 
problem,” and also, explores how they addressed indigenous rights and treaties. The 
chapter begins by examining the federal government’s 1966-1967 Hawthorn Report.212 
This Report appears to have provided the legal means, and some arguments, to enable the 
federal government to rationalize the White Paper to end the treaty relationship between 
indigenous people and the Crown. In my view, the Hawthorn Report was a preface to the 
White Paper. Second, it is imperative that I examine the political ideals of Pierre Trudeau 
and, to a lesser extent, Jean Chretien, in relation to the White Paper to fully grasp the 
leadership’s motives for ending the legal status of “Indians.” The White Paper’s 
organizational framework described six legislative categories and other issues, 
understanding these as barriers that impeded indigenous people from achieving 
“equality.” Finally, this chapter explores the reactions to the White Paper from the media 
(newspapers), First Nations leaders, and the Anglican Church of Canada. 
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The Hawthorn Report 1966-1967 
 In 1960, Indians gained the right to vote in federal elections, and studies were 
carried out to determine the needs of Indians in relation to non-Indian Canadians. The 
most significant study produced and commissioned by the federal government was a two 
volume Hawthorn Report, released in 1966-1967. The Hawthorn Report played a 
significant role in Indian and Canadian government relations, from the time of 
publication during the late 1960s to the early 1970s. The Hawthorn Report was initiated 
in 1963 by the federal Liberal government and the Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, to determine how best to “update” its Indian policies.213 In 1964, 
Harry B. Hawthorn, from the University of British Columbia, was commissioned to 
conduct a national survey of Canadian Indians: “a study of the social, educational, and 
economical situation of the Indians in Canada....”214 The scope of Hawthorn’s national 
survey on Indians was broad and summarized in the two volume Hawthorn Report. The 
final recommendations were numerous but most significantly, they did define Indian 
status within the broader Canadian political framework as “Citizen Plus.”215 “Citizen 
Plus” was defined as, “in addition to the normal rights and duties of citizenship, Indians 
possess certain additional rights as charter members of the Canadian community.”216 In 
other words, Indian people possessed the same individual rights and duties of citizenship 
as non-Indian Canadians, but additionally possessed treaty rights negotiated between 
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indigenous people and the Crown from the late eighteenth century and onward to present. 
Thus, the significance of treaties and Indian lands, was first established in the federal 
Hawthorn Report, and subsequently remained central to both publications that followed 
in 1969 the White Paper, and the1970 Red Paper.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 The contemporary relevance of the treaties, as defined in the Hawthorn Report, 
was to “evaluate the extent to which they [treaties] seem to complicate the development 
of a more intimate and extensive involvement with the provinces....”217 Thus, the Report 
interpreted the relevance of treaties in the context of the status of Indians and lands 
relative to the provincial framework, rather than to the federal or national administration. 
The Report organized the treaties’ provisions into six categories: 1) treaty gifts (items 
such as medallions to commemorate the treaty); 2) annuities; 3) land; 4) hunting, fishing, 
and trapping; 5) liquor; and 6) socio-economic matters, inclusive of education, 
agriculture, and health and welfare.
218
 The Hawthorn Report found that only two of the 
six categories had longstanding legal implications that applied to the obligations of the 
federal government.
219
 The first involved hunting, fishing, and trapping, which had treaty 
significance in established jurisprudence (legal decisions), but these rights when 
compared to the massive economic needs of the Indian communities, were seen as 
minimal.
220
 The second category related to lands, or reserve lands, had significance as 
treaty provisions and were constitutionally recognized under section 91 (24) of the BNA 
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Act 1867.
221
 One option, according to the Hawthorn Report, was to amend the 
constitution by abolishing section 91 (24), which reads, “Indians and lands reserved for 
the Indians.”222 The Hawthorn Report’s conclusion, in regards to treaties and lands, 
therefore was that the federal obligations to Indians were minimal. In other words, the 
Hawthorn Report’s findings on the relevance of the treaties regarding land were that, 
when compared to the larger economic needs of the Indian communities, treaties were 
insignificant. In relation to discussions about Indian rights to land, the Report concluded 
that the federal government had a “great deal of freedom” in its responsibilities under the 
“permissive grant” of the constitutional authority of section 91 (24) of the BNA Act.223  
 In essence, the Hawthorn Report’s comprehensive examination sought alternative 
ways to move administrative and governing responsibility of Indians into the provincial 
framework with the least possible legislative or constitutional change. Thus, by moving 
the responsibility of Indians, and the six treaty provisions (categories), from federal 
jurisdiction to provincial jurisdiction the end result was the extinguishment of treaties and 
Indian lands. Therefore, officially, while the Hawthorn Report may not have been the 
catalyst for the White Paper and its proposed mandate, the Report was a precedent that 
sought the legal relinquishment of treaties and lands from federal responsibility. The 
relevance of the Hawthorn Report, vis-à-vis the treaties and lands, remains crucial to the 
future economic sustainability of First Nations communities. Thus I argue that without 
the control of lands and resources, First Nations communities would not survive 
economically, and would be forced to assimilate into the Canadian economic system.  
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 The Hawthorn Report’s recommendations on treaties, inclusive of the six 
categories described, were incorporated into the White Paper, which also sought to 
advance the federal government’s position on “ending” the legal status of Indians and 
indigenous rights to lands. Nevertheless, the Trudeau administration, as authors of the 
White Paper, largely ignored the Hawthorn Report because it did not fit with the concept 
of Trudeau’s “Just Society.”224 Trudeau’s “Just Society” was built on the premise of an 
open government, where “regular” people may participate in government with regards to 
policy decision-making that may affect their lives, and where individual rights are 
paramount.
225
 Further, those rights are free from legal and bureaucratic hindrance in the 
pursuit of economic freedom to the individual’s fullest potential in a society.226  
 Although the Hawthorn Report advocated for the provincial rather than federal 
application of laws and services for Indian people, the Report’s recommendations did not 
harmonize with a “Just Society.” According to Meijer-Drees, the Hawthorn Report was 
considered “noteworthy, [but] its recommendations were not implemented.”227 Although 
the Trudeau government did not officially adopt the Hawthorn Report’s 
recommendations in regards to treaties and lands, arguably, the White Paper’s intentions 
were the same. Trudeau’s Liberals produced the Report and subsequently, the White 
Paper and viewed treaties and lands through a narrow economic lens. Thus, Trudeau’s 
Liberals claimed that reserve lands could not sustain communities; and for this reason, 
therefore, they endeavoured to abolish treaties and Indian lands and transfer the 
                                                     
224
 Laurie Meijer-Drees, The Indian Association of Alberta, 165. 
225
 Thomas S. Axworthy and Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Towards a Just Society: The Trudeau 
Years (Ontario, Canada: Penguin Books, 1990), 358. The core values of Trudeau’s “Just 
Society” involved freedom, equality, and equality of opportunity for all. 
226
 Laurie Meijer-Drees, The Indian Association of Alberta, 166. 
227
 Thomas S. Axworthy and Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Towards a Just Society, 357-360. 
65 
responsibility for Indians from the federal government to the provinces. Hence, the 
Hawthorn Report’s findings may or may not have played a role in the development of the 
White Paper proposal, in 1969; however, the Report’s findings on the legal distinction to 
“end” treaties and lands were reinforced in the White Paper. In other words, the Trudeau 
Liberals unofficially adopted the Hawthorn Report’s findings regarding the termination 
of treaties with First Nations people, and proposed to adopt a fee simple approach for 
reserve lands.  
 Whereas, the Hawthorn Report was commissioned to investigate the social and 
economic conditions of First Nations people, it inadvertently set a precedent to “end” 
Indians in Canada. The relevance of the Hawthorn Report to the broader issue of Indians 
is that the Hawthorn Report provided “noteworthy” information on the legal distinction 
of Indians and treaties; treaties were summarized as having “minimal” significance when 
compared to the larger social economic need of the Indians. Therefore, the Hawthorn 
Report’s findings granted the federal government the flexibility and “permissive grant,” 
or unilateral authority, to legally “end” Indians and treaties. Contrastingly, in 1970, 
Harold Cardinal and the Indian Chiefs of Alberta stated in the Red Paper that treaty was 
significant to First Nations people as “historic, moral, and legal” agreements.228 
Pierre Trudeau and the Liberal’s Political Values 
 Trudeau’s education played a significant role in the development of his social 
policies regarding Indians, and influenced his election campaign to become Prime 
Minister of Canada. In the federal election campaign of 1968, Pierre Trudeau’s Liberals 
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introduced ideas of how government could run, and themes of the Hawthorn Report - to 
“end” Indians and treaties - were frequently emphasized during the early part of his 
tenure, as Prime Minister from 1968 to1970. His election platform marked the creation of 
his conception of Canada’s “Just Society.” Trudeau’s election promises also included 
participatory democracy, as a mandatory feature of this proposed “Just Society.”229 
Participatory democracy, as described by Trudeau, is a process where political decisions 
are made directly by the populous,
230
 including Indians. This section briefly examines 
Trudeau’s political ideas of participatory democracy and the values of a “Just Society,” in 
relation to Indians and to demonstrate how his political ideals conflicted with indigenous 
people’s interests, regarding their collective interests to treaties and lands. Trudeau’s 
education and history is important to examine in the context of nation building, and the 
affects of nation building on Indian people.
231
 The chapter’s focus is not on nation 
building per se, but in the process of nation building, Trudeau’s proposed ideals of 
participatory democracy and a “Just Society” which manifested into social policy that had 
profound effects on Indian people.  
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 Trudeau’s political values largely stemmed from his educational background in 
law and economics. Trudeau graduated with a law degree from the University of 
Montreal in 1943, and then entered a Master’s program at Harvard University, in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1944.
232
 Thereafter, he obtained a joint degree in 
Economics and Political Science.
233
 Further, his education in these fields brought him to 
the École Libre des Science Politiques in Paris, and the London School of Economics.
234
 
According to his Memoirs, his graduate life at Harvard had a profound effect on his 
beliefs about individual freedom. Trudeau stated “[t]he view that every human must 
remain free to shape his own destiny became for me a certainty...”235 This idea of 
individual access to freedom remained with Trudeau into his political career and, once in 
power, as the Prime Minister of Canada, his idea of freedom combined his with 
educational background in law and economics created profound effects on Indian people. 
These ideas are evident in the Liberal government’s White Paper of 1969. Trudeau’s 
knowledge of law and politics and, to a lesser extent, economics, were crucial to the 
themes expressed in the White Paper, and specifically with regard to the “end” of Indians 
and treaties.  
 Trudeau also formulated his ideas prior to his political career, described above, as 
a co-founder of Cité Libre magazine, which was a magazine produced by young 
                                                     
232
 Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Memoirs (Toronto, Ontario: McClelland & Steward Inc, 1993), 
37. 
233
 Ibid, 38.  
234
 Ibid, 39. 
235
 Ibid, 40. Also, for a closer look at Trudeau’s idea about “freedom” as it relates to a 
“just society,” read Thomas S. Axworthy and Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Towards a Just 
Society: The Trudeau Years (Ontario, Canada: Penguin Books, 1990), 357. 
68 
intellectuals against totalitarianism.
236
 Trudeau believed in the idea of participatory 
democracy where the individual rights of regular people were paramount in transforming 
society. Ultimately, his ideas were in conflict with indigenous people’s interests. Trudeau 
did not believe in special status or “Citizens Plus,” particularly in regard to ethnic and 
minority groups, his experience with special status was largely influenced by the Quebec 
experience.
237
 The Quebec experience had taught Trudeau that special status may lead to 
separatism, or nationalism, from the Canadian confederation. Thus, Trudeau must have 
found fault with Indian people having proposed special status under the Indian Act, as per 
the Hawthorn Report, and through treaties negotiated between the Crown and indigenous 
people. 
 Although freedom was its central theme, Trudeau contended in 1968 that a “Just 
Society” involved equality and, in his words: “I mean equality of opportunity.”238 On the 
one hand, Trudeau envisioned an organized society structured in a way to enhance the 
individual’s freedom and to advance the individual the means to that freedom.239 On the 
other hand, Trudeau did not precisely spell out what equality of opportunity might 
involve, but he claimed there were many facets to this concept. Trudeau defines the 
concept of equality of opportunity in this way: 
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 Now Canada seems to me a land blessed by the gods to pursue a policy of the 
 greatest equality of opportunity. A young country with its ethnicities and its 
 religions, an immense country with varied geographic regions, a federalist 
 country, Canada had [sic], besides, a political tradition that was neither 
 completely liberation nor completely state dominated, but was based, rather, on 
 the collaboration necessary between government and the private sector and on 
 direct action of the state to protect the weak against the strong, the needy against 
 the wealthy.
240
  
In essence, Trudeau’s “Just Society” involved economic equality, and the freedom of the 
individual without legislative barriers that could hinder individual development, 
combined with an interest in national unity.
241
 
 Trudeau’s election campaign was built not only on this promise of a “Just 
Society,” but participatory democracy: a process (within the formal structures of 
government) where all citizens participate in government through policy decisions that 
may affect their lives. His proposition for participatory democracy involved “regular” 
Canadians in the decision making processes of government, but also involved “different 
kinds of people” in the decision making process.242 It is unclear as to what Trudeau 
constituted as “different kinds of people,” and if, in fact, his views referred to minority 
groups inclusive, or exclusive, of Indian people.  
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 According to Weaver, the idea to revised the Indian Act and make it less 
restrictive, started with the Pearson government, and the Trudeau administration 
subsequently supported it and encouraged Indians to participate, in the revisionary 
process.
243
 Weaver contends that the consultation meetings, between the government and 
Indian people, were an early connection between citizen participation and Indian policy, 
in 1967, and reflected the interest in revising the Indian Act.
244
 The consultation meetings 
were hosted by the federal government and involved the participation of Indian leaders 
(for example, the IAA and National Indian Brotherhood) from across the country, 
designed to amend the Indian Act. Native leaders who attended the consultation meetings 
expressed varying opinion on revising the Indian Act, and some Indian leaders called for 
its abolishment.
245
  
 Consultation started in the summer of 1968, and concluded in the spring of 1969. 
Indian leaders, such as Harold Cardinal, attended these meetings and expressed their 
concerns that the Liberal government did not recognize Indian treaties and aboriginal 
claims to land. According to Cardinal, indigenous leaders stated that, before 
implementing any new policy that called for Indian participation, the government must 
move to recognize treaties and aboriginal claims, above all.
246
 Therefore, the impact of 
the so called participatory democracy on First Nations people, as subsequently expressed 
in the White Paper, would be to “end” the legal status of Indians under the Indian Act, 
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and thereby, enfranchise them as Canadian citizens. Trudeau’s vision of participatory 
democracy for Indians, therefore, not only meant the ‘end’ of Indians, it also meant 
reform of the federal government. 
 Fundamental to Trudeau’s participatory democracy, was government reform 
where individual ministers would influence government agenda and policy channels. 
Participatory democracy in this aspect, according to Trudeau, involved increasing the 
effectiveness of government, or the powers of the House of Commons.
247
 A part of the 
effectiveness of government meant giving more flexibility and power to ministers and 
Parliamentarians to enact decisions: “Not only should ministers be able to enact the 
Government agenda, but members of Parliament should be able to influence the 
Government through work in the House and more effectively represent their constituents 
in legislation and services.”248 Although flexibility was emphasized to ministers and 
Parliamentarians, the final decision rested with the collective cabinet.
249
 The significance 
of government reform, relative to the then minister of Indian Affairs, was that the policy 
to be enacted was not necessarily made with the consent of those targeted by the policy, 
for example, indigenous people. The consultation meetings discussed by Weaver and 
Cardinal, exemplify how policy that, if enacted, potentially would have meant that the 
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development had consulted with the Indians, 
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regardless of its content.
250
 As Trudeau’s then Minister of Indian Affairs, Jean Chrétien 
stated in the House of Commons, about the contents of the White Paper of 1969, it 
represented “things said by the Indian people” at the consultation meetings.251 According 
to Chrétien the consultation meetings were initiated to amend the Indian Act but, 
apparently, not to consult on the proposed contents of the White Paper. The Indian Chiefs 
of Alberta claimed, in the 1970 Red Paper, consultation did not take place. The Alberta 
Chiefs stated, “The answer is no Treaty Indian asked for any of these things [in the White 
Paper] and yet through his [Chrétien] concept of consultation, the Minister said that his 
White Paper was in response to things said by Indians.”252 Nevertheless, as Weaver 
described “Indian participatory democracy,” as understood by Indian leaders from across 
the country who did attend consultation meetings, was a process whereby the Liberal 
government experimented with policy and, in the process of experimentation, failed to 
implement its intentions as laid out in the White Paper.
253
  
 Fundamentally, Trudeau’s vision of participatory democracy involved individual 
citizens, but not collective groups, nor tribal collectives. In the 1960s, Indians resided 
primarily on reserves and saw themselves as communal rather than individuals in the 
Western idea of individualism and society. Philosopher John Locke, in Two Treatises on 
Civil Government, claims the individual was paramount before the state. Equally 
significant was Trudeau’s writing on the role of the state and the individual. In the early 
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1960s, Trudeau wrote, “the purpose of Locke and Rousseau…was to explain the origins 
and justify the existence of political authority per se; the theories of contract which they 
derived from natural law or reason were meant to ensure that within a given state bad 
governments could readily be replaced by good ones…”254 Although the idea of replacing 
“bad” governments with “good” ones, the underlying message here was that the state is 
viewed as an “aggregate of individuals, not groups, whose fundamental freedoms are to 
be respected.”255 Locke’s theory of individualism and the role of the state were consistent 
with Trudeau’s Liberals philosophy of the individual embedded in the proposed policy to 
individuate Indians: “Liberals believe that every individual has a special dimension, a 
uniqueness that cries out to be realized, and the purpose of life is to realize that 
potential.”256 Trudeau expressed his philosophy of the state, as follows, “[t]he role of the 
state is to create the conditions under which individuals have the broadest possible choice 
in pursuing the goal of self-fulfilment [sic].”257 In this light, participatory democracy was 
essential to “end” the collective interests, such as those interests representative of 
indigenous people, while bolstering individual representation. This shift was fundamental 
to Trudeau’s imagined “Just Society” and was evident in the 1969 White Paper.  
 In relation to the “Just Society,” Cardinal welcomed Trudeau’s vision of a new 
society built on justice; “Indian leaders, briefly hopeful that Mr. Trudeau’s Just Society 
might include native people, were ready to work with the new ministers.”258 
Retrospectively, however, Trudeau’s “Just Society” was built on the norm of 
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individualism with a focus on economic prosperity, rather than a society compelled to 
correct historical injustice.
259
 The indigenous leadership of the time initially had some 
hope in including the word “might” with Trudeau’s concept of a “Just Society,” but they 
wisely remained skeptical of government officials.
260
 
Jean Chrétien: Trudeau’s Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
 How did the Liberal Party’s concept of a “Just Society” manifest in social policy? 
Part of the answer lies with the newly appointed Minister of Indian Affairs, Jean 
Chrétien. First elected to Parliament in 1963 and again in 1968, Jean Chrétien, under the 
Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau, would be appointed in 1968 as the Minister of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development; an appointment he would keep for over seven 
years.
261
 As Indian Affairs Minister, Chrétien was largely responsible for creating and 
selling the White Paper to Indians and non-Indians. The White Paper was reflective of 
Trudeau’s values of a “Just Society,” which focused on solving poverty and other issues 
affecting Indian communities.
262
  
 Chrétien studied law at the University of Laval, in Quebec City, and became the 
president of the student Liberal Club.
263
 As he explained, his political involvement began 
as a “fun” exercise, but he quickly found that it was a great “influential instrument for 
social change.”264 Socially and patriotically, Chrétien believed in being Canadian. He 
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attests that his family helped influence and shaped his attitude on patriotism, particularly 
during World War II when many French Canadians were against the war in Europe, and 
his national patriotism carried through to his political life.
265
 In Straight from the Heart 
(1985), Chrétien stated that, Quebec’s refusal to the support the war in Europe seemed 
like a “wrong judgement.”266 His father supported “conscription” and one of his three 
brothers enlisted and was accepted, one had medical conditions and the other was a 
doctor. Chrétien himself did not enlist. Politically, Chrétien shared the value of Canadian 
patriotism with Trudeau.  
 Once elected to Parliament, in 1963, Chrétien served under Prime Minister Lester 
Pearson’s Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, and later as Minister of National 
Revenue.
267
  He was appointed to Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
in 1968, under Trudeau.
268
 Chrétien admits that he did not know what the portfolio would 
entail, and was first hesitant with the appointment. However, according to Chrétien, 
Trudeau made the argument that Chrétien’s situation was similar to that of the Indian: 
“You’re from a minority group, you don’t speak much English, [and] you’ve known 
poverty.”269 In some respect, Chrétien shared economic similarities with the Indian 
people in regards to poverty, but lacked the background or historical knowledge 
regarding First Nations people generally. Chrétien’s educational background in law, 
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partly explains his lack of knowledge of indigenous people’s history.270 Moreover, 
Chrétien’s reluctance may also be explained by his lack “corporate memory” of the 
ministerial post.
271
 Weaver described the lack of knowledge within a ministerial post, as 
“corporate memory.”272 As a result, new policies Chrétien promoted as ground-breaking 
had often been previously tested or untested.
273
 As Weaver explained “corporate 
memory” is when “ministers...leave a portfolio, they often take with them their collective 
experience. As a result, the collective experience is not synthesized and lessons from 
even the recent past remain unlearned. Thus, policies promoted as innovative often 
arouse a strong sense of déjà vu in Indians and with longstanding government 
employees.”274 Arguably, the White Paper exemplified how governmental policies create 
a sense of déjà vu for Indians.
275
 
 Chrétien’s first task, as Minister of Indian Affairs, was to tackle the “Indian 
problem” resulting in the White Paper proposal.276 Addressing the “Indian problem” was 
a nuanced task that involved promoting the White Paper to Canadian business and 
industry, to the Canadian public, and to the Indian leadership. For example, in mid-June 
1969, Chrétien addressed the Indian Chiefs at a convention held at Sucker Creek, 
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Alberta.
277
 His speech to the Indian Chiefs was similar to Weaver’s account of Chrétien’s 
speech at the consultation meetings a year previous: as “diffuse[d]” and indiscernible.278 
However, Weaver did not explain why Chrétien’s speech was incoherent to the Indian 
leaders. One possible explanation for his incoherent speech could be due to his lack of 
English speaking ability. As Weaver stated, Chrétien was “still mastering English,” when 
he was appointed Minister of Indian Affairs.
279
 Nevertheless, in his speech Chrétien 
spoke of equality in terms of “advantages” and “responsibility” equal to other non-
indigenous Canadians, and that the Indians need to be “free” to make their own decisions 
regarding lands. As Chrétien stated, “the National Indian Brotherhood [proposed] looked 
into treaties, I said then that I am interested. You will see next week how interested I am 
[sic].”280 Chrétien’s comments in this speech from June 20, 1969, around treaties and 
lands early indicate his intention to terminate the legal status of Indians, and his desire to 
promote the White Paper to the Indian Chiefs of Alberta. Moreover, Chrétien’s statement 
regarding the NIB and their interest in treaty research contradicted the intentions 
expressed in the White Paper of terminating treaties. Further, Chrétien’ statements 
regarding “advantages,” and “responsibility,” and to be “free” became the hallmarks of 
the White Paper. With respect to Indian participation into the broader economic system, 
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treaties were a hindrance for Indians to economic prosperity, according to the White 
Paper.
281
 
 Chrétien’s speech ostensibly promoted the recognition of treaties, but essentially 
Chrétien was promoting the completed White Paper to the Indian Chiefs of Alberta, in 
mid-June 1969. In retrospect, Chrétien’s speech to the Indian Chiefs had distinguishable 
features of the White Paper. His speech was short and touched on themes of the White 
Paper. Chrétien began by addressing the delegates in attendance, with “[i]f I was an 
Indian to talk [to] you I would talke [sic] to you very frankly about the situation.”282 
Chrétien’s statement “[i]f I was an Indian...,” suggested he wanted to connect with the 
Indian leaders. Further, he claimed that the Canadian public was “unrealistic” in regards 
to the situation of Indian people, and that this situation must change. Chrétien referred to 
the situation of Indian people, in terms of selling land and borrowing money. And, he 
implied, that in order for Indians to be “free,” the cumbersome bureaucracy of the Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development must change without describing what that would 
entail. Chrétien also failed to explain in any great detail about the “end” of the status of 
Indians, but he did describe the preservation of Indian culture in the context of a “proud 
history.”283 In closing, he stated that the Indian “situation” had never been at the forefront 
of the Canadian public, and that the Indian leadership had spoken very clearly of their 
intentions. Interestingly, Chrétien did not ask what the Indian leadership’s intentions 
were, nor if their intentions would have an impact on government policy. Nevertheless, 
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Chrétien stated “[n]ext week the Federal government will let no change for the future of 
the Indians in the country [sic].”284 In other words, the federal government would not 
make any major changes regarding legislation that may affect Indians or, in effect, status-
quo will prevail. Therefore, Chrétien’s speech to the Indian Chiefs of Alberta, in 1969, 
seems contradictory. He spoke of changes in the Indian Department, and then concludes 
with “no change[s]” for Indian people of Canada. Thus, his opening remarks to the Indian 
Chiefs promoted the contents of the White Paper. Only after the federal announcement of 
the White Paper, on June 25
th
 1969, Chrétien did begin to aggressively sell the White 
Paper to non-indigenous Canadian citizenry and industry.  
The Contents of the White Paper 
 The Canadian government’s perspective on Indian treaties and lands is evident in 
the 1969 White Paper. Trudeau’s political ideas and in particular his concepts of a “Just 
Society” - freedom, equality, and equality of opportunity- were manifested in the White 
Paper. These ideas would combat poverty in Indian communities, as Trudeau and 
Chrétien anticipated, but they planned the abolishment of treaties and Indian lands, and to 
assimilate indigenous people into the Canadian body politic.
285
 Thus, to achieve equality, 
six legislative challenges were proposed in the White Paper. This section explores three 
of the six proposals of the White Paper framework to achieve equality: 1) “Legal 
Structure,” 2) “Claims and Treaties,” and 3) “Indian Lands.”  
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1) “Legal Structure” 
 The White Paper stated that in order to achieve a “Just Society,” Canada must 
eliminate discriminatory legislation.
286
 To do so, the federal government proposed to 
change the “Legal Structure” related to Indians and read; “Legislative and constitutional 
bases of discrimination be removed.”287 This proposal wished to remove any reference to 
Indians from the Constitution Act of 1867. The federal government claimed that their 
goal to remove Indians from the Constitution should be always in “view.”288 Further, the 
authors stated that section 91 (24) of the Constitution, which deals exclusively with 
Indians and reserve lands granted legal force to, and enactment of, the Indian Act of 
1876, would also be repealed. The government’s rationale for the abolishment of the 
Indian Act and section 91 (24) of the Constitution, was based on “things said by the 
Indians,” at the consultation meetings.289 Thus, by eliminating any reference to Indians in 
the Constitution, according to the White Paper, “would be necessary to end the legal 
distinction between Indians and other Canadians.”290 
2) “Claims and Treaties” 
 To “end” the legal distinction between Indians and non-Indians, the authors of the 
White Paper also proposed to “end” the historical treaty relationship between Indians and 
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the Crown. Under the fifth proposal, the White Paper claimed that the historical treaties 
between Indian people and the federal government were largely misunderstood. In fact, 
the White Paper stated that “lawful obligations must be recognized…”291 The White 
Paper contended that the literal translation of the treaties reveals that only “minimal” 
promises were made, such as cash, land, annuities, hunting, fishing, trapping, schools and 
teachers, “and in one treaty, a medicine chest” and, were refuted in the White Paper.292 
Therefore, the White Paper rationalized the significance of the treaties in relation to the 
contemporary needs of the Indian population and it determined that treaties would 
continue to “decline.”293 
3) “Indian Lands” 
 The sixth proposal titled “Indian Lands” was to “end” the reserve system under 
the Indian Act, and convert reserve land to individualized ownership; accordingly, the 
“control of Indian lands should be transferred to the Indian people.”294 The White Paper 
stated that “[t]he policy statement is clear about the transfer of land to the Indian 
people.”295 Under the existing system, title to Indian lands (reserves) is held under the 
authority of the federal government regarding administrative control and legislative 
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authority.
296
 In other words, the federal government assumed the role of “trustee” of 
indigenous lands and, as such, administered the day-to-day operations associated with the 
land. The White Paper rationale for its position regarding the transfer to privatization of 
reserve lands arose from the consultation meetings with the Indian leadership and as a 
result, the government claimed that the Indians wanted individual control of their 
lands.
297
 The White Paper stated that under the prevailing system of land ownership, the 
federal government and the Indian Act were not flexible enough for economic 
development.
298
 Therefore, the government proposed to transfer control of reserve lands 
to Indians via individual land ownership, or “fee simple.”299 The White Paper proposed 
that the transfer might happen in various ways, but it preferred the “Indian Lands Act.”300 
Under the “Indian Lands Act,” Indians would be “free” to have individual ownership of 
reserve lands. However, according to the White Paper, individuals who benefited and 
participated in land ownership would be governed by the “Lands Act.”301 In effect, the 
“Indian Lands Act” determined who would qualify or benefit from the land.  
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Public Response to the White Paper 
 After the initial public announcement of the federal White Paper on Indian policy 
in June 1969, segments of the Canadian population began to immediately respond to the 
federal proposal with varying opinions, particularly the Canadian Press (newspapers), the 
Indian leadership, and the Anglican Church of Canada. 
1) The Canadian Press  
 This section briefly examines newspapers from several regions in Canada.
302
 
Initially, the response of the press to the federal government announcement was positive, 
soon after its release to the public.
303
 Press reports generally link the federal statement to 
Canadian citizenship.
304
 For instance, headlines read: “Indians Independent ‘Within five 
Years,’” “Ottawa Plans to Treat Indians as Full Citizens,” “Indian Policy Heralds Just 
Society,” “Full Equality For Indian Set,” “New Start for Indians,” “New Indian Deal 
Offered Provinces,” and “Ottawa Plans to Abolish Treaties, Move out of Indian Affairs in 
5 Years.”305 The press seemed to argue that the White Paper was a positive advocacy for 
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Indian people and their emersion into mainstream society. Further, the press alluded to 
Indian people in Canada, as defined under the Indian Act, as “non-citizens,” and pointed 
to “Trudeau’s heroic aim to change this” situation for Indians.306 According to Anderson 
and Robertson, the media did not challenge the government’s position on Indian policy, 
rather “[t]he papers uncritically adopted the Trudeau government’s paternalistic position 
that natives needed to be absorbed into the body politic.”307 In other words, the press 
assumed that assimilation of Indian people into mainstream society was the best 
alternative for Indians and thereby adopting full citizenship.
308
 Robertson argued that the 
mainstream press advocated for the White Paper in terms of citizenship, and that “First 
Nations persons were, in fact, less than citizens, and that assimilation would rectify this 
juridico-political deficit.”309 
 Collectively, the headlines implied that Indians were a part of contemporary 
Canadian life, and they should not be relics of the past. Thus, the newspaper headlines of 
the time failed to capture what was not proposed in the White Paper; the termination of 
the treaty relationship between Canadians and Indian people.
310
 The newspapers also 
assumed that the Indian people were in complete agreement with the White Paper on 
issues such as citizenship. Generally, however, newspapers focused on Canadian 
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citizenship and the social situation of indigenous people, rather than the termination of 
treaties and lands.  
 The social situation of indigenous people was captured by one newspaper 
columnist’s remarks through a reference to Trudeau’s “Just Society.” Anthony Westell, a 
columnist from the Toronto Daily Star reported, “the intention is to end the state of 
dependency which the Indians have being forced to live...and to push them out into the 
world to make it on their own.”311 Westell infantilized Indians implying they needed to 
experience the real world rather than depend on the federal government for security. 
Other journalists did not express an official challenge, but reiterated the federal 
perspective. For example, the Lethbridge Herald covered the policy statement by directly 
excerpting from the White Paper; “This Government believes in equality that all men and 
women have equal rights...especially that no one shall be shut out because of his race.”312 
The Lethbridge Herald did not explicitly express its stance on the federal proposal, but 
seemed to advocate for the federal position by ending the column with reference to 
equality.
313
  
 By mid-July 1969, the press reported that indigenous people were dissatisfied 
with the government’s White Paper, and indigenous dissent appeared on the front pages 
of some newspapers: “‘Insincere and a Lair’ Ontario Indians blast Chretien,” “Do Indians 
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Dare Buy Chretien’s Dream?” and “Ottawa Opts out in Policy Switch.”314 Judging by the 
press coverage, the Indian leadership disagreed with the federal government’s White 
Paper, and the press quickly responded. For example, the Toronto Weekend Telegram 
reported that, in a meeting held in Toronto, 25 July 1969, by the Union of Ontario 
Indians, the Minister of Indian Affairs, Jean Chrétien and members of his department, 
attended the meeting unannounced and faced a barrage of “verbal abuse,” in which 
Chrétien was accused of being “insincere and a liar.”315 Yet, another columnist from the 
Ottawa Citizen stated that “the Indians know a bird in the hand and they are not at all sure 
about those in the provincial bushes.”316 In the latter article, the columnist referred to the 
transfer of service of Indians from the federal government to provincial authorities. In 
other words, Indians have a relationship with the federal government under the Indian Act 
regarding service provisions, yet there are no agreements with the provinces. 
Nevertheless, the level of criticism was negative from both the press and, to a large 
extent, from the Indian leadership to the federal government’s statement on Indian policy.  
 On June 26 of 1969, initial reactions from indigenous leaders to the policy 
statement by the federal government were mixed, and were recorded by several 
newspapers. According to the The Globe and Mail, Indian leaders varied in opinion, from 
“disappointing” to “encouraging.”317 In the same paper, Harold Cardinal, president of the 
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IAA, expressed “delight” to the proposed abolishment of the Department of Indian 
Affairs. According to Weaver, Cardinal’s stance on the Indian Affairs Branch was 
consistent with his previous public statements in this regard.
318
 On the same day, the 
Ottawa Citizen recorded Andrew Nicholas, president of Union of New Brunswick 
Indians, as stating he was “most disturbed by the proposal,” by virtue of fact that the 
Minister of Indian Affairs, Jean Chrétien, had failed to consult “Indian officials first” for 
input into the White Paper.
319
 According to the newspapers, the Indian leadership was not 
consulted on the White Paper regarding the new policy direction. Eventually, despite 
their initial positive embrace of the White Paper the press overall responded to 
indigenous concerns over the federal proposal. The newspapers reported that the Indian 
leadership expressed a mixture of opinions, from “delight” to disappointment, in response 
to the statement by the federal government.  
2) Indian Leaders 
 The native leadership also responded to the federal White Paper, soon after its 
release, particularly with respect to the consultation meetings, treaties and lands. The 
consultation meetings were significant to the federal government and its White Paper in 
three ways: 1) the consultation meetings were designed to elicit Indians to amend the 
Indian Act, but apparently no discussions on the Act had happened; 2) as Weaver points 
out, the consultation meetings were an early indication of Trudeau’s political idea of 
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participatory democracy; and 3) the consultation meetings provided the government with 
a platform to justify its White Paper on Indians. 
  In late June 1969, the Indian leadership sent out a press release expressing their 
sentiments about the White Paper. The press reported that the Indian leaders touched on 
many issues, but for the Indian leadership, the most prominent issues were the lack of 
consultation, the collective rejection of treaties, and government’s perspectives on Indian 
lands. Indian leaders increasingly used the press to express their opposition to the federal 
White Paper. In a statement to the press from the Nation Indian Brotherhood (NIB) on 26 
June, 1969 the Indian leadership expressed angry disapproval of the federal White Paper 
on Indian policy.
320
 The NIB release stated that the government failed to negotiate with 
Indian people. For example, the press release explicitly cited the highly publicized 
consultation meetings with the federal government, where the NIB had “made it 
abundantly clear” to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development that the 
first step was to honour the treaties.
321
 The NIB stated, “[y]et in the policy statement this 
[treaties] over-riding concern receives only passing mention where the Government is 
prepared to “allow – transitional freer hunting...but ignores the principle involved.”322 
Further, the NIB expressed the opinion that there was no mention of the earlier Hawthorn 
Report in the White Paper; the former had recognized the special rights of indigenous 
people in Canada. The press release by the NIB concluded with the following statement; 
“If we accept this policy, and in the process lose our rights and our lands, we become 
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willing partners in cultural genocide.”323 The latter statement from the NIB was angry 
and it was clear that they did not want to participate in a process of legislative destruction 
of Indian people. 
 The press statement by the NIB set the national tone and level of criticism by the 
Indian leadership towards the White Paper. On the same day, 26 June, 1969, a press 
release authored by the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood (hereafter, the MIB), echoed the 
NIB statements regarding the federal statement on Indian policy. The president of the 
MIB, Dave Courchene, represented the organization’s position to the White Paper.324 The 
contents and tone from the MIB statement were one of anger and frustration: “I am 
returning from Ottawa with feelings of bitterness, frustration, and anger. Once again the 
future of Indian people ha[s] been dealt with in a high-handed and arbitrary manner.”325 
The statement dealt at some length with the points described in the White Paper but, like 
the NIB’s criticism, the prominent dispute was the government’s failure to consult. 
Courchene’s response to the White Paper was forceful and read; “[w]e have not been 
consulted, we have been advised of decisions already taken. I feel like a man who has 
been told he must die and am now to be consulted on the method of implementing this 
decision.”326 Courchene’s statement echoed the NIB statement regarding the absence of 
consultation, but in a more aggressive fashion. Interestingly, unlike the NIB’s statement, 
Courchene’s statement expounded on the elimination of the constitutional distinction of 
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Indians, which explained the many varied opinions native leaders had on the topic. His 
press release let Canadian society know that the government’s White Paper did not 
reflect indigenous interests, and that the Indian people were not consulted on the White 
Paper. Courchene’s statement to the press regarding Indians was clearly directed at the 
Canadian public; “[t]hey have decided to impose upon all of us [Indians] their solution to 
inequality.”327 Further, he explained that the elimination of Indians from the constitution 
will not bring “equality” to Indians. He compared the federal government’s position on 
language rights and French Canadians to the policy on Indians; “...that such references 
[sic] to two foundation nations and bilingualism should be eliminated so that there would 
be no distinction between the ‘French’ and ‘English’ and the rest of the Canadian ethnic 
population.”328 Thus, Courchene stated that “equality is based on mutual respect, rather 
than legislative inclusion or exclusion.”329 By mid-July, the Indian leadership had 
“uniformly” rejected the White Paper.330   
 The Indian leadership’s views on the federal government’s White Paper had not 
changed a year after the federal announcement and they consistently used the press to get 
their message across to the Canadian public. One year later, in June 1970, the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) radio program Indian Magazine interviewed Indian 
leaders from across the country regarding the White Paper.
331
 Central to the discussion, 
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amongst other issues, was the debate on policy versus proposal. Both Forrest Walkham 
(Union of British Columbia Chiefs) and Andrew Nicholas (Executive Director of the 
Union of New Brunswick Indians) were in agreement that the White Paper was presented 
to Indians as a policy paper rather than a proposal.
332
 Nicholas was the most vocal critic 
of the term “proposal” and stated that “it was only after the objections from Indian people 
that he [Chrétien] changed the word to proposal, because it was an outright policy when 
he announced it.”333 Nevertheless, in regards to treaties and Indian rights, Cardinal 
remained sceptical about the government’s approach to ending treaties. Cardinal 
described how the government had relied on the Canadian public as the final vote to 
decide on the future of treaties: “[o]ur [Indian leadership] problem in the past have been 
the federal government went to the Canadian people and said that they [Indians] want 
special status, and we [federal government] think we should treat them equally...
334
 
Cardinal seemed to indicate that the government relied on the Canadian public to advance 
policy in their favour. In a sense, the Canadian public was sort of a last resort to recruit 
support for the government regarding Indian policy. Cardinal stated that the 
government’s approach by going to the public had put Indian leaders on the “defensive” 
and, as a consequence, the Indians were on the “losing end.”335 An example of Cardinal’s 
fear regarding the Canadian public as the final arbiter was illustrated in a speech by 
Trudeau, in 1969. At a Liberal Convention dinner, Trudeau announced to the members in 
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attendance that “it will be up to all of you people to make your minds up and to choose 
for or against it, and to discuss it with the Indians,”336 regarding treaties and claims. In 
other words, according to Trudeau, the burden lay with the Canadian public regarding the 
future of treaties and aboriginal claims. 
3) The Anglican Church of Canada 
 Segments of the Canadian population were in support of the Indian leadership 
opposing the government’s proposed new direction on Indian policy. For example, in 
1970, the Anglican Church of Canada published a booklet called the Bulletin 201 
dedicated to native issues of concern to the Church.
337
 The booklet reproduced excerpts 
from speeches by Jean Chrétien, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 
and leadership from various Indian organizations, such as the NIB and MIB. The booklet 
is valuable in terms of reporting on the various speeches by Indians, non-Indians, 
government, and the response to them from the Anglican Church. 
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 In 1970, the Anglican General Synod represented one and one half million 
Canadians.
338
 In August 1969, the General Synod had their annual meeting to discuss 
native issues and concerns. The Hendry Report emerged as document from this meeting 
of the General Synod and the Hendry Report outlined nine recommendations about native 
concerns for the Church to resolve.
339
 Of significance was a recommendation to address a 
letter to the Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau concerning the White Paper on 
Indian policy. Howard H. Clark, the Anglican bishop of the time, wrote to Pierre Trudeau 
expressing the Church’s concern over the government’s proposed direction regarding 
Indian policy. The letter addressed four items that needed immediate attention. First, 
Clark urged the federal government to cease any new “policy” regarding the interests of 
Indians people without “in depth” consultation.340 Second, Clark expressed support for 
Indian’s pursuit of justice through the recognition of treaty and aboriginal rights.341 Third, 
Clark advocated for financial support to Indian organizations for the purpose of research 
relating to treaty and aboriginal rights.
342
 Finally, Clark expressed concern of the 
Church’s governing body (General Synod), requesting that the Bishop interpret the 
resolution to the federal government and their affiliate dioceses. Although, the fourth 
resolution was unclear and the booklet did not explain why an interpretation of its 
recommendations to the federal government and affiliated dioceses was needed. 
However, the fourth resolution may be interpreted to mean that the Synod’s letter to 
Prime Minister Trudeau was in effect, the Church’s official position to the federal 
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government and its representatives of indigenous people quest for “justice.”343 Clark 
closed by emphasizing the government’s “present course,” be reconsidered in light of the 
expressed desires of the Indian leadership. The Synod’s letter to Trudeau further stated 
that the Church’s official position in pursuit of justice would occur through the 
recognition and settlement of the “ancient” treaties, signed with the Crown. The booklet’s 
expression of disapproval and rejection of the federal White Paper on Indian policy 
clearly affirmed the Anglican Church’s opposition in harmony with Indian leadership to 
the federal proposal and its quest to reject treaties and aboriginal claims to land. 
Conclusion 
 In the 1960’s, the Canadian federal government’s perspective on Indian treaties 
and lands was ostensibly influenced by the Hawthorn Report of 1967. Although the 
federal government officially rejected the Hawthorn’s findings, similarities between the 
Report and the federal White Paper on treaties and lands, were clear. The goal of the 
White Paper, like the Hawthorn Report, was to terminate Indian status and to assimilate 
Indian people into the Canadian body politic. Assimilation was also evident in Pierre 
Trudeau’s notion of a “Just Society.” A “Just Society” supplied the political architecture 
for construction of the equality claims of the White Paper. This proposition to assimilate 
Indians into Canadian society also was evident in the front headlines of Canadian 
newspapers in response to the White Paper from 1969 to 1970 when they declared 
Indians as full citizens.  
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 In contrast, the Indian leadership and Anglican Church of Canada expressed 
opposition to the White Paper. The impact of the White Paper crystallized in the minds of 
the Indian leadership, once they realized the federal government’s proposed termination 
of the treaty relationship, and the removal of communal lands in favour of fee simple title 
holdings, were realized. As a result, both the Indian leadership and Anglican Church 
reacted strongly against the White Paper. In sum, the White Paper catapulted Indian 
people to collectivity reject the federal White Paper, and in the process developed their 
own document called the Red Paper.  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
Chapter Three - The Indian Leadership Responds: The IAA and Citizen Plus/the 
Red Paper 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that the narrative of the federal White Paper 
(1969) proposed to eliminate indigenous interest to land by terminating the legal 
existence of treaty responsibilities as a means to ultimately solve what the government 
administration saw as the “Indian problem.” This chapter examines how the IAA and 
Harold Cardinal responded to the themes of assimilation and citizenship articulated in the 
White Paper. Cardinal and the IAA developed a response titled, Citizen Plus/the Red 
Paper (1970), which is more commonly referred to as the Red Paper as a counter-
narrative to the government’s master narrative of assimilation and citizenship.344 In 
contrast to the White Paper, the Red Paper emphasized treaties, as the foundation for the 
future relationship between Indians and the government.  
 This chapter is divided into three sections. Section one examines the 1970 Red 
Paper authored by the IAA. The Red Paper was foremost a counter-proposal that stressed 
the importance of the treaties between the Crown and Indian people, it also proposed two 
strategies on education and economic development.
345
 Specifically, this section will 
briefly explore the Red Paper’s six counter-proposals as a response to the White Paper. 
Following a review of the six counter-proposals, three of the six counter-proposals will 
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be explored in detail: “Indians Status,” “Lawful Obligations,” and “Indian Control of 
Indian lands.”346 The latter three points, argued in the Red Paper, emphasized the need 
for the federal government to honour its commitments made in the treaties to Indian 
people; the Red Paper stated that the treaties were “historical, moral, and, legal” 
agreements.
347
 
 In section two I briefly examine the IAA from its inception in 1939 to the mid 
1960s.
348
 Although research into native political groups in the early part of the twentieth 
century has been scarce, the work of historian Laurie Meijer-Drees titled (2002) The 
Indian Association of Alberta: A History of Political Action will be used here to consider 
the IAA. The relevance of the IAA is important to examine in relation to the 1970 Red 
Paper for several reasons. First, the IAA produced a generation of leaders outside the 
framework of the government sponsored band councils.
349
 The IAA executive was 
elected democratically and the positions were non-paid until 1968, which had appeal to 
the grassroots.
350
  According to Meijer-Drees, like band council, the IAA experienced 
roadblocks when dealing with Indian Affairs administrators; however, “unlike band 
council leaders, the IAA leaders could use the media to draw public support to their cause 
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and raise collective concerns such as treaty rights.”351 Second, the IAA was able to 
generate a “shared understanding of what was possible within the Canadian polity.”352 As 
Meijer-Drees explains, “[t]his kind of experience was a vital precursor for the emergence 
of the successful nation-level Indian political movement of the late 1960s. The IAA was 
one of the first Indian associations in Western Canada to extend itself beyond treaty 
boundaries.”353 Meijer-Drees’ work is essential in reconstructing the IAA in the early 
years and as a viable and credible organization able to negotiate with the federal 
government on treaty and treaty rights at a particular period in history when Indian 
political activity was prohibited.
354
 Therefore, this section briefly examines the origins of 
the IAA in relation to forming a provincial-wide Association through its networks and 
constitution. Emphasis, however, is on the significant events of the 1940s related to the 
IAA. These events included the two Memorials on Indian Affairs in 1944, and 1945, and 
the 1946-1948 Special Joint Committee to amend the Indian Act.
355
 The relevance of the 
1940s for the IAA in dealing with government authorities, demonstrates that the 
Association had a long history of political activism on such issues as treaty rights, and 
was not an ad-hoc formulation conjured up in the Red Paper. In other words, issues such 
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as treaty rights, education, and community improvement had “historical depth.”356 Taken 
together, these events in IAA history showed that the Association was a credible 
organization within government circles, whether or not the government catered to their 
demands.
357
 With the success of the IAA in their dealing with the government also came 
with it a low point in the organization’s history during the 1950s, which also is briefly 
examined. 
 Section three examines Harold Cardinal president of the IAA in the late 1960s. In 
the late 1960s, the IAA elected a young and vibrant leader with the goal of revitalizing 
the organization with new ideals in the form of pursuing treaties.
358
 Cardinal restructured 
the organization’s constitution to better reflect its provincial-wide membership and its 
interest to pursue treaty rights.
359
 The pursuit to reassert treaties as a political goal was 
congruent with Cardinal’s political philosophy. Cardinal’s political philosophy derived 
from his family and cultural backgrounds, and his passion for treaties often showed in 
speeches to the IAA. However, as leader, Cardinal faced opposition from critics within 
the Indian community, who denounced his leadership and the direction of the Association 
regarding treaty claims. Nevertheless, aside from the politics and those who opposed 
Cardinal’s leadership, Cardinal and the IAA produced the most significant counter-
proposal to the federal government’s White Paper, the Red Paper of 1970. 
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Section One: The 1970 Red Paper 
As stated in this chapter’s introduction, in 1970 the IAA produced its counter-
proposal titled Citizens Plus/the Red Paper, as a response to the federal government’s 
White Paper regarding Indian policy. The Red Paper advocated the importance of treaties 
to First Nations people and its foundation in the relationship between the federal 
government and Indian people. This section examines the Red Paper and what it 
advocated as important in the relationship between both parties. The Red Paper identified 
six counter-proposals and is listed here in the following under two broader groups: 1) (a) 
“Unique Indian Culture and Contribution,” (b) “Channels for Services,” and (c) 
“Enriched Services” (the latter two proposals will be examined together, as they are 
similar). The following three proposals will be examined specifically, and are: 2) (a) 
“Legal status of Indians,” (b) “Lawful obligations” and, (c) “Indian Control of Indian 
Lands.” 
1. A) “Unique Indian Culture and Contribution” 
Under the section 1. A “Unique Indian Culture and Contribution” to Canadian 
life, the Red Paper reminded the federal government that Indian people had contributed 
to Canadian history via the historical treaties.
360
 This perspective is reinforced by legal 
scholar John Borrows, treaties “helped to bring Canada into existence within certain 
areas...”361 where these agreements were signed. During the release of the Red Paper in 
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1970, the IAA had documented that Indian history was absent from popular history 
books.
362
 Nevertheless, the IAA argued that the treaties were an important part of our 
collective Canadian history. However, the treaties have not been officially accepted as 
part of the Canadian historical record. According to Cardinal, the government knew that 
the Indian owned the land and, “it was upon this basis...that the treaties were 
negotiated.”363 Thus, by the virtue of the signed treaties, Indians have “played a 
significant role in Canadian history.”364  
1. B & C) “Channels for Services” and “Enriched Services” 
The unique contribution by Indians to Canadian history, leads to the next proposal 
presented in the Red Paper, service provisions. Through the acknowledgement and 
implementation of treaties, the IAA argued that “Channels for Services” were the 
responsibility of the federal government, rather than the provinces. The federal 
government, the IAA argued, had a direct responsibility to provide services to Indians as 
defined under the treaties, and the 1867 BNA Act.
365
 The other selling feature of the 
White Paper, according to the Red Paper, was “Enriched Services.” The government 
stated that those reserve communities who were the “farthest behind” would be helped 
first.
366
 The Red Paper stated that all reserve communities needed financial assistance, 
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particularly in areas of “economical, social, and cultural development.”367 Further, the 
Red Paper stated that the government’s version of financial assistance were “bribes” to 
get Indians to accept the rest of the White Paper proposal. 
2. A) “The Legal Status of Indians” 
 The “Legal Status of Indians” was defined in two pieces of legislation, the British 
North American Act of 1867 (BNA), and the Indian Act of 1876. Both Acts were 
addressed in the Red Paper. The Red Paper responded to proposal one of the White 
Paper, which read that: “Legislative and constitutional bases of discrimination be 
removed.”368 The Red Paper rejected the proposal and stated: “We say the recognition of 
Indian status is essential for justice.”369 The Red Paper stated that the legal recognition of 
Indians was necessary if Indians were to be treated “justly.” The IAA contested the 
proposal to repeal of the Indian Act, under section 91 (24) of the Constitution Act of 
1867, and stated that the legal definition of registered Indians must remain.
370
 Section 91 
(24) also gave sole jurisdiction to the federal government to administer the affairs of 
“Indians, and lands reserved for Indians.”371 In regard to Indians, the White Paper clearly 
stated that the government saw this legislation as “discriminatory legislation.” The 
government proposed that section 91 (24) from the Constitution Act be removed to ensure 
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that there was no legal distinction between Indians and non-Indians.
372
 Since the 
Constitution Act of 1867 came into legal force in the late nineteenth century, it had 
created Indian people as a “race a part” by placing them into a different constitutional 
category separate from other Canadians. In effect, the constitutional category of Indian 
peoples defines a distinct relationship with the Crown as compared to the immigrant 
population. Nonetheless, the government’s goal of constitutional change and the 
elimination of the “Indian problem” would be realized. Under the government’s proposal, 
constitutional change would cease to recognize the legal status of Indians, so too would 
the Indian Act. 
 The IAA argued that it was neither possible nor desirable to terminate the Indian 
Act. The authors of the counter-proposal contended that the Indian Act provided the legal 
framework for Indians, just as the many federal and provincial statutes provide for 
Canadians.
373
 However, the Red Paper stated that the Indian Act was essential to review, 
as some sections were outdated and other sections would need further amendments.
374
 
According to the IAA, if an Indian wishes to voluntarily give up their legal status, or 
become enfranchised and integrate into the mainstream society, the choice was her/his.
375
 
The Indian Act of 1876 was created under section 91 (24) of the Constitution Act of 1867 
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to administer “Indians and Indian lands.”376 Cardinal argued that under section 91 (24) of 
the BNA Act ensured the distribution of the treaty provisions by the dominion 
government after Confederation.
377
 Further, he argued that the Indian Act was created for 
the administration of the reserve lands provided by the treaties.
378
 Indeed, proposal one of 
the White Paper was essential for the IAA, as it recognized their legal distinction as 
Indians. Hence, the intent of proposal one of the White Paper, was to terminate the legal 
barriers that it would make Indians equal with other Canadians. 
2. B) “Lawful Obligations” 
 The opening paragraph of the Red Paper reinforced the importance of treaties for 
First Nations people under “Lawful Obligations.” The Red Paper emphasized treaties and 
lands as being significant to the “well being of future generations” of Indian people.379 
Essentially the authors of the White Paper viewed the historical treaties between 
indigenous people and the federal government, as inappropriate in modern times.
380
 The 
Red Paper refuted that statement in the White Paper regarding the treaties and stated that 
the federal government had a “distorted view” of treaties.381 The authors of the Red 
Paper argued that the treaties signed with the Crown were “historic, moral, and legal” 
agreements and, 
382
 were the source of indigenous people’s rights in Canada. For 
instance, the Red Paper stated, “[t]he Indian people see the treaties as the basis of all their 
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rights and status.”383 The Red Paper’s position was that treaties signed in 1876 (Treaty 
6), 1877 (Treaty 7), and 1899 (Treaty 8) contained certain promises.
384
 Treaty promises, 
according to the Red Paper, were captured in other forms not readily evident in the treaty 
text, such as verbal promises through treaty negotiations, and promises that were captured 
through oral history.
385
 The Red Paper argued for modernizing the treaties to maintain 
the “intent and spirit” of the agreements and to serve as a guide in the re-negotiations 
process.
386
 The IAA stated that if the federal government wanted the cooperation of the 
indigenous people to any new policy then it must agree to recognize the importance of 
the historical treaties to Indians. From an indigenous perspective, Indians had always 
thought of lands as their own and did not surrender these lands, but promised to “share” 
lands and resources equally with the new comers to their territories.
387
  
2. C) “Indian Control of Indian Lands” 
 The idea of treaty implementation was consistent with the spirit of the historical 
treaties in relation to “Indian Control of Indian Lands.” In minimal terms, the Red Paper 
agreed with the White Paper to transfer land to Indian people. The IAA argued that they 
wanted control and title of reserve lands, but not in the context of Euro-Canadian 
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definition of land ownership. The IAA leadership argued that the federal government was 
in error on two points regarding Indian lands. The Red Paper claimed Indians were 
“actual” owners of the land, and that legal title had been held in trust by the Crown.388 
The Red Paper also contended that the federal government was in error in its 
“assumption” that the only way lands could be transferred to the control of Indian people 
was through private property.
389
 The IAA stated that legally the Indian Act could be 
amended to “give Indians control of lands without changing the fact that the title is…held 
in trust.”390 The Red Paper emphasized that land must be held in trust by the Crown, 
because the “true owners of the land are not yet born.”391 In other words, the IAA did not 
believe in individual land ownership rather that land was collectively owned, and any 
decisions regarding land would affect future generations.  
The Evolution of the IAA 
 The Indian Association of Alberta (IAA) founded in 1939 represented Indian and 
Métis interests in the province. Founders John Callihoo and Métis leader Malcolm Norris 
were influenced by the mandates and design of the League of Indian Nations of Western 
Canada, the United Farmers Association (UFA) and other cooperative political 
organizations, such as the Métis Association of Alberta (MAA).
392
 In part, the IAA’s 
origins were partly a response to the poor social and economic conditions experienced by 
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First Nations and Métis communities across Alberta. However, the other part, according 
to Meijer-Drees, the IAA “was concerned, on an everyday level, with treaty rights.”393  
 The founding of the IAA also “represented a deliberate break from the league,” 
establishing a “new direction” in provincial Indian politics.394 During the war years, the 
IAA restructured its organization to reflect its membership, and to separate ties with the 
League of Indian Nations of Western Canada.
395
 To completely separate ties with the 
League, the IAA’s new structure involved a network of locals and governed by a set of 
By-laws and a Constitution.
396
 The governing structure of the IAA was similar to the 
United Farmers of Alberta and the Métis Association of Alberta.
397
 The formal structures 
of the IAA appeared to be sound on paper, however “creating stable and representative” 
associations had been a challenge for Indian leaders.
398
 In part, the challenge to create 
“stable and representative” organizations may have been due to the formal structures 
themselves. That is, formal organizational structures were Eurocentric and, as a 
consequence, alien to Indian people. Nevertheless, as Meijer-Drees suggested, “[t]he 
founding of the IAA neither marked the “beginning” of Indian political activity nor 
constituted a sign of Indians peoples’ realization that they could now assert some form of 
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public power; rather, the IAA simply represented a new forum within which reserve 
communities could voice some of their concern.”399 In other words, the IAA as an 
organization was a new organizational vehicle for Indian activism, but the ideals and 
collectivity it represented had a long history.  
 The IAA could not have existed without its member communities. Reserve 
membership of the IAA was initially slow during the first few decades of the 
Association’s existence. Momentum increased after the war years. Most of the IAA’s 
membership consisted of individual members from reserve communities from central 
Alberta and around the Edmonton region.
400
 By the mid 1940s, the IAA grew to include 
membership from communities in the southern portion of the province. However, the 
Treaty 7 First Nations were the last reserve communities to join the IAA due to two 
factors. First, members of southern reserves were suspicious of the IAA’s mainly “Cree 
origins.”401 Second, the southern communities of Blackfoot, Bloods, and Sarcee were far 
better situated economically than the northern communities.
402
 For example, the 
Blackfoot reserve sold a huge scale of land that created a trust fund that supplied the band 
members with “food, clothing, houses, and farming assistance.”403 Nevertheless, by 1951, 
the Blackfoot reserve joined the IAA.
404
 Therefore by the 1950s, the IAA’s membership 
expanded to include a province-wide association encompassing the majority of treaty 
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Indians in the province. The change in membership to a province organization, the IAA 
better reflected the needs of Indian communities in the province with a shared vision on 
issues such as treaty rights, which would play an important role in the Red Paper. 
IAA During the War Years 
  As a provincial organization, and a relatively young organization, the IAA’s 
experience in dealing with its members was local and grassroots with little experience at 
the national level. However, three events in the war years were significant for the IAA, 
not only to establish itself as a credible organization but also as an advocate for treaty 
Indians in Alberta: the two briefs titled “Memorials on Indian Affairs”405 the first in 
1944, and the second in 1945, and the 1946 Special Joint Committee to amend the Indian 
Act. 
  In the mid 1940s, the IAA took advantage of its relationship with government 
officials and carefully prepared two briefs both titled, “Memorial on Indian Affairs.” In 
1944, the IAA submitted its first “Memorial” to Ottawa to initiate discussions with the 
government. The “Memorial” set the tone of dialogue between the IAA and Indian 
Affairs. The 1944 “Memorial” addressed the needs of Alberta Indian communities 
regarding health, education, and reserve lands.
406
 Specifically, the IAA’s “Memorial” 
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focused on five main issues: 1) the extension of social legislation to Indian peoples, 2) 
Indian education, 3) band membership, 4) matters of general policy, and 5) gaining 
official Indian Affairs recognition for the IAA.
407
 Less significance was placed on treaty 
rights and more emphasis on equal opportunity, relative to non-Indians:  
 The Association feels that Indians should receive the same as white citizens 
 receive...Home gardens, herds of goats, etc. are far from being a solution to the 
 pressing needs of many bands whose geographical locations as such that both are 
 rendered impractical or whose reserve is so economically inadequate neither 
 garden nor goats survive the infertile soil and the rigours of the climate.
408
 
According to Meijer-Drees, the IAA’s first “Memorial,” particularly on education and 
social legislation, “appealed directly to the political ideas being promoted by the Liberal 
government of 1944.”409 The Liberal government of Mackenzie King, pressured by the 
CCF
410
 political party challenged the governing party to introduce broader social policies 
that were congruent with a large number of Canadians. As a result, the Liberal 
government introduced a new initiative which emphasized the “assurance of opportunity 
of employment” through the government’s program to “achieve prosperity and social 
security.”411 On the release of the new Liberal government initiative, the IAA requested 
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that this new plan be extended to Indians alike, rather than the bleak alternative of neither 
“gardens nor goats.”412  
 In 1945, the IAA’s second “Memorial” to Indian Affairs reinforced much of its 
first petition. The second “Memorial” addressed much of the same issues as the first but 
within the context of “changes brought about by the war and gave the IAA a chance to 
reiterate its suggestions to Indian Affairs.”413 Of importance in the second “Memorial,” 
was the IAA public called for amending the Indian Act determinant upon a Royal 
Commission to investigate the needs of Indian people from across the country.
414
 The 
IAA suggested that Indian people should be consulted: “This Royal Commission should 
have among its members, Indians; and should be empowered to visit [a]ll Indian reserves, 
and all bands of non-Treaty Indians…Particularly, Indians themselves should be 
encouraged to testify freely and without fear of reprisal.”415 The IAA’s suggestion of a 
Royal Commission was not “fixated on protesting old Indian policy; rather it actively 
suggested changes to that policy in response to changes in reserve economies over the 
course of the Second World War.”416 Nevertheless, the IAA pressured government 
officials for action in terms of a Royal Commission. But the government was reluctant 
for such an inquiry. The reluctance for a Royal Commission stemmed from the origins of 
Indian Affairs and its links to religious denominations.
417
 The IAA pressured the federal 
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government for a Royal Commission, and gained publicity through public rallies and 
press coverage, and particularly in Parliament by IAA supporter, MP G. H. Castleden.
418
 
In the end, a Royal Commission did not materialize until 1996, but in the process the IAA 
established itself as “credible and relatively powerful lobby force” regarding treaty 
Indians of Alberta.
419
 According to Meijer-Drees, the Canadian government struggled to 
devise new policies to promote the “reconstruction and rehabilitation” of the country, 
after the Second World War. However, through the “reconstruction and rehabilitation” of 
the country, the IAA through their political organizing and by its two “Memorials,” 
sought to place Indian peoples within this broader discussion.
420
 
 With the success of the IAA through its two “Memorials” on Indian Affairs, 
concerning matters important to Indian communities in Alberta, the organization was 
invited to make a presentation to the Special Joint Committee to revise the Indian Act in 
1946. In that year, the Minister of Mines and Resources responsible for Indian Affairs, J. 
Allison Glen, announced to Parliament that a Joint committee of the Senate and the 
House of Commons be appointed to examine and consider the Indian Act.
421
 The Special 
Committee examined the Indian Administration in general, treaty rights, band 
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membership, enfranchisement of Indians, Indian schools, and “all social and economic 
status of Indians and their advancement.”422 Essentially, the Committee was to examine 
the Indian Act and make improvements, the Committee sought input from civil servants, 
in the administration of Indian Affairs, Indian “experts,” and Indian organizations.423 The 
IAA was invited to make a presentation to the Special Joint Committee.  
 It was evident after the presentation by the IAA to the Special Joint Committee in 
the late 1940s, the IAA and the Committee differed on the nature of citizenship rights for 
Indian people. When the IAA presented its brief to the Special Joint Committee they 
argued that “treaty rights could be reconciled with citizenship, that treaties between 
Indian peoples and the Crown were the source of citizenship rights for Indian peoples.”424 
The IAA explained that the treaties promised certain rights to Indian peoples, including 
the “full right to education and social security, so that Indian peoples might take their 
place as citizens within Canada.”425 However, the Special Joint Committee believed that 
Indians should have citizenship rights but differed in regards to the means of acquiring 
citizenship. In the Committee’s view, “Indians remained wards of the Crown under the 
Indian Act until they had “risen” to the standards of British citizenship.”426 In sum, the 
IAA did not deny citizenship rights, but argued that the route source to citizenship was 
treaties. Alternatively, the Special Joint Committee viewed citizenship rights along the 
line of Indian policy that is, through education and employment, as they claimed; “the 
committee believed that only being educated in their civic duties and gaining a place 
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within Canadian economy could Indian people assume full citizenship.”427 In other 
words, the Committee did not agree with the IAA that citizenship rights could be gain 
simply through treaties. 
 By 1948, the Special Joint Committee concluded with its final report and 
recommendations for the government to consider. The Committee recommended that the 
Indian Act be completely revised, extension of social legislation to Indians, greater self-
government within Indian communities, and greater powers to band councils.
428
 Treaty 
rights also figured prominently in the Committee’s final report to emphasize that the 
“government had to clearly establish the nature of treaty rights.”429 The importance of the 
IAA’s brief to the Special Joint Committee emphasized the importance of treaty rights as 
well as educational and economic “liberty” for Indian people. By doing so, the IAA drew 
public attention to the poor social and economic conditions of Indian communities a 
precursor to the 1966 Hawthorn Report.
430
  
 By the late 1940s, the success of the IAA also drew public attention to the poor 
social and economic conditions of Indian people placing emphasis on treaties in relation 
to acquiring citizenship rights. Thus the 1940s represented a milestone for the IAA, as 
they set a precedent for native organizations in Canada in dealing with government 
officials regarding Indians needs. Specifically, the IAA demonstrated that it was 
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politically active in asserting treaty rights, particularly during the 1940s when treaty 
rights were misunderstood.
431
 Moreover, the IAA advocated social and economic issues 
within government circles at a time when government had no official policy to negotiate 
with Indians. The IAA’s political activitism was also astonishing due to the fact that, in 
1927 amendments to the Indian Act had prohibited Indians from political activity or to 
hire a lawyer to make claims against the government.
432
 The IAA was able to link its 
agenda for treaty rights to contemporary concerns of the day.
433
 These concerns involved 
social and economic needs of Indian communities in Alberta and sought resolutions to 
these problems. In part, the forward thinking of the IAA to improve current Indian policy 
fell in line with the government of the day, particularly on the liberal democratic idea of 
equality.  
 Nevertheless, in the decade of the 1950s the IAA went through a period of “co-
optation,” as a consequence of their successful representations with the federal 
government.
434
 Michael Lacy explains co-optation in terms of the “threat model,” where 
“the power holder moves to include persons who are in some sense ‘hostile’ rather than 
friendly,” to its programme.435 According to Meijer-Drees, although Lacy’s “threat 
model” referenced the American situation, it might also apply to the Canadian situation in 
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its dealings with Indian people.
436
 She explained that the IAA’s “protests in government 
activity and policies, in Parliament and through the press, threatened the government’s 
liberal and democratic reputation.”437 As a consequence, the government responded to the 
threat by including the IAA in its follow-up meetings to amend the Indian Act and in a 
series of government sponsored conferences held across the country from 1951 through 
to 1956.
438
 
 By the 1960s, change occurred to the IAA, in “character and face.”439 Three 
factors contributed to the political revitalization of the IAA: “The passing of the old IAA 
leadership, the political instability in Ottawa, and the overhaul of Indian Affairs in the 
1960s.”440 And, most significant, in 1968, the IAA elected Harold Cardinal, a younger 
educated man, with the goal of pursuing treaty rights. As the new president of the IAA, 
one of Cardinal’s first tasks was to amend the organization’s Constitution. By 1969, the 
organization’s Constitution and By-laws were amended more accurately to reflect the 
needs of a provincial-wide association and to prioritize: “Indian Treaty Rights.”441  
 The 1960s also saw the definition of the IAA membership revised to include 
individual Indian reserves rather than individual persons.
442
 The expansion of the IAA’s 
membership to include individual reserves rather than individuals was in contrast to the 
early beginnings of the organization when they struggled to gain individual membership. 
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However, the restructuring of the IAA importantly increased the organization’s growth to 
better represent Indian communities, rather than individuals. The IAA’s new structure 
was important in terms of unifying reserve communities to become a coherent singular 
voice to advocate for the recognition of treaty rights as expressed in the Red Paper. Once 
revised, the IAA’s new structure was better equipped to represent the interests of Indian 
communities scattered throughout a large geographic area, in Alberta. Overall, the IAA 
was a much more organized association under Harold Cardinal.  
Harold Cardinal, President of the IAA 
 In the 1960s, young indigenous people were dropping out of high school in 
droves; an exception to this pattern was Harold Cardinal.
443
 Cardinal came from the 
Sucker Creek reserve in Northern Alberta.
444
 Cardinal was elected president of the IAA 
in 1968, at 24 years old, he was the Association’s youngest president serving nine terms 
in office from 1968-77.
445
 Cardinal’s education was unique; he had a law background and 
also was indoctrinated into traditional knowledge by Cree elders. Cardinal consistently 
acknowledged the Cree elders who contributed to his learning: “I offer my special 
gratitude to the many elders whose views...helped shape my thinking.”446 Cardinal’s 
thinking was shaped by cultural values that flowed directly from the “isolate, tightly knit 
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community, [in which] everyone has responsibilities to the group that sense of collective 
is a deeply held value, in Cree nation [people].”447 Ingrained in his cultural teaching was 
a strong sense of responsibility. Cardinal spoke on behalf of those who taught him, his 
teachers: 
 “so, he wouldn’t be just speaking for himself, he would be speaking on behalf of 
 those who taught him, his teachers. You’re expressing the value of your teachers 
 and making sure that gets carried forward. That’s a particular cultural teaching, 
 but that you’re there as a vehicle to carry forward that message that comes from 
 behind you, and it’s your burden to carry that forward. And, once you’re done, 
 you give it to somebody else. So, it’s not about you being the star, it’s about 
 carrying it, till you give it away.”448  
To carry the message forward did not always mean cultural teachings for Cardinal; his 
cultural teachings intertwined with the political thinking taught to him by his father, Fred 
Cardinal. Fred Cardinal had been a chief of his community and was also a former 
political leader of the IAA (1965-1966 and again from 1967 to 1968), which was 
influential in shaping Harold’s thinking.449 Cardinal described the importance of the 
treaties, as being an Indian “Magna Carta.”450 In other words, Cardinal carried and 
forwarded the message through the generations, in particular to reinforce the importance 
of treaties for Indian people.  
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 Cardinal’s political perspective on treaties was also reflected in his political 
philosophy regarding aboriginal governance. Cardinal’s political philosophy is best 
captured in a speech at the 26
th
 Annual Convention of the IAA held in Standoff, Alberta, 
in 1970.
451
 At the conference, Cardinal updated the Convention members regarding the 
two strategies that were at the core of the Red Paper: education and economic 
development. He stated that the IAA’s belief was built on the principle that the “local 
people must be given opportunities to participate fully in all matters that effect their 
community.”452 Cardinal discussed the Alberta Indian Development System, reinforcing 
the Red Paper’s two strategies of education and economic development, to illustrate how 
community members could control and influence the programs they develop. Cardinal 
informed the delegates that the philosophy of community control was at the foundation of 
the Alberta Indian Development System.
453
 In other words, Cardinal believed in a 
bottom-up solution to poverty using the two avenues of education and economic 
development, rather than the top-down approach proposed by Department of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development. He stated that the role of the IAA would be to 
acquire external funding and to maintain political and community support for the Alberta 
Indian Development System.
454
 Cardinal’s also stated that the philosophy of the bottom-
up approach also required change. He stated that “[p]rogress is a nice word, but change is 
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its motivator and change has its enemies.”455 By “enemies,” Cardinal was referring to a 
member of the Indian community who had actively denounced his leadership and 
criticized the IAA’s stance on the White Paper.456 
 As a relatively new and young leader in 1968, Cardinal may not have had much 
experience with leadership nor was he accustomed to the role that negative publicity 
sometimes brought. Newspapers portrayed Cardinal as Pierre Trudeau’s equivalent, 
“Alberta Indians choose leader in Trudeau mold.”457 Meijer-Drees stated that Cardinal 
has been labelled the “enfant terrible” of Indian politics yet “he was a forceful speaker 
and presence on the national scene at a time when Aboriginal issues were very much in 
the public eye.”458 In all meetings with the press and other public forums, Cardinal 
consistently took these opportunities to refer to the treaties. According to Meijer-Drees, 
Cardinal’s activities contrasted significantly with former IAA leaders of the past who 
choose instead to “draw attention to social and economic issues” facing Indian 
communities.
459
 Nevertheless, Cardinal’s leadership was a balancing act between two 
extremes. On one hand, he was “burden[ed]” with the responsibility to embrace his 
cultural teachings, and to carry the message and the importance of the treaties, forward. 
On the other hand, Cardinal’s leadership skills and educational background allowed him 
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to command a certain respect from his followers on political issues involving the IAA. 
Leading a provincial-wide association involved a careful balancing act between culture, 
political activism, and carrying the message for change forward. Cardinal’s primary 
challenge was political, in terms of staving off intended external and internal attacks 
threatening the cohesion of the organization. 
Harold Cardinal and the IAA had their critics from within the Indian community 
during the development of the Red Paper. At a meeting of the IAA in April 1970 at Lake 
Isle, Alberta, Cardinal updated the delegates on the progress of the Red Paper and took 
the opportunity to address some of his critics.
460
 Cardinal’s primary critic was William 
Wuttunee, a Cree leader from Saskatchewan and a practicing lawyer.
461
 Wuttunee 
attacked Cardinal and the IAA leadership over the course of several months, starting in 
January 1970, in regards to the IAA’ position on the federal White Paper. Meijer-Drees 
suggested that Wuttunee “may have been predisposed to criticize the IAA”.462 She 
suggested that as early as 1965, the IAA had rejected Wuttunee’s invitation to unite, or to 
partner with the National Indian Council (NIC). The founding of the NIC occurred in 
1963, with government funding and opened its first office in Regina, with William 
Wuttenee as its president.
463
 The goals of the NIC were to “promote Indian culture, to 
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unite Indians, and to serve Indians and their organizations.”464 Wuttunee was a 
controversial leader, not only to Cardinal but as leader of the NIC in the early years of its 
existence. Peter McFarlane described the NIC committee and Wuttunee as “urbanites” or 
“professionals with little experience in the grass-roots movement.”465  
Other issues may have created criticism for Cardinal and the IAA. According to 
Meijer-Drees, Wuttunee “singled out” Cardinal and the IAA, “as examples of how such 
close financial ties [with the government] would corrupt any attempt at improving life for 
Indian peoples in Canada.”466 Wuttunee criticized Cardinal and the IAA, particularly 
about the IAA’s salaries under the new federal government funding system.467 As 
Wuttunee stated: “It seems odd indeed that the hierarchy of the Indian Association of 
Alberta should pay themselves such exorbitant salaries, bearing in mind the poverty in 
which so many of the Indian people live.”468 Wuttunee attacked Cardinal as a “bitter 
person,” and a “conservative, whose ideas on treaties were outdated.”469 While Wuttunee 
may have been predisposed to criticize Cardinal and the IAA, on the government 
funding, salaries, and its stance on treaties, ironically, Wuttenee himself was also 
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receiving funds from the government to promote the White Paper within the Indian 
communities. 
By transparently informing the IAA membership about these criticisms, Cardinal 
was accountable to the membership. Cardinal informed the assembled members that 
Wuttunee was also paid by the government and on contract with the Indian Affairs 
Department when, he claimed, Wuttunee’s salary was just under a thousand dollars, over 
a three day period.
470
 Cardinal further announced that the purpose of Wuttunee’s contract 
with the Indian Affairs Department was to “engage” the Indian community to accept the 
federal White Paper proposal.
471
 In other words, Wuttunee’s argument against the Red 
Paper could be motivated by self-interest and financial gain. Nevertheless, Cardinal’s 
closing remarks to the IAA membership emphasized that the organization’s goals were to 
create “brotherhood, and goodwill” rather than financial gain.472 Although Cardinal and 
Wuttunee may have both received federal payment, it is important to illustrate their 
political differences. Wuttunee advocated for the White Paper, whereas Cardinal helped 
crafted the Red Paper as a critique of the White Paper. The papers were diametrically 
opposed: the White Paper promoted assimilation; the Red Paper advocated for treaty 
recognition and independence.  
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Conclusion  
 In 1970, the IAA’s Red Paper argued that the federal government’s White Paper 
proposal on Indians amounted to assimilation rather than equality for Indian people. The 
authors of the Red Paper drew from the long history of political action, developed since 
the inception of the IAA in 1939. Although the IAA focused its energy on combating 
poverty through social and economic programs, the treaty relationship was central in the 
minds of its membership in the early years. After the Second World War, the IAA 
experienced a period of “co-optation” in the 1950 and early 1960s, as a result of their 
successful representations in the 1940s. In the late 1960s, the IAA rejuvenated with new 
and younger leadership. In 1968, with the election of Harold Cardinal, treaties were again 
at the forefront of the organization’s mandate forming part of the revised constitution. In 
1970, treaty and treaty rights were the foundation of the IAA’s Red Paper. The Red 
Paper proposed to engage treaty rights in the operation of two strategies to combat 
poverty in native communities: the first through education and the second through an 
economic development plan. The IAA insisted that treaties continue to be an important 
source of identity for most Indians, even long after the original signing over a century 
ago. In the final chapter, I examine why treaties were important to First Nations people, 
both as a source of “self-sufficiency” and as a model of governance. 
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Chapter Four – Governance: A Comparative Analysis of the White Paper’s and the 
Red Paper’s Vision for Indians 
Introduction 
 In previous chapters I discussed how the narrative of the 1969 federal White 
Paper had consistently advocated for the complete immersion of Indian people into 
mainstream Canadian society. This was the federal government’s method of proposing 
“equality” for Indian people. The counter-narrative to the federal White Paper was the 
Red Paper released in 1970 by the IAA, the Red Paper opposed the federal position of 
“equality” and stated that Indians signed the treaties with the Crown as equal partners. 
Therefore, treaties for the IAA remain legitimate sacred agreements. The Red Paper 
further stated the government was bound to fulfill the promises they made to Indian 
people from the 1763 Royal Proclamation forward.  
In this chapter, the researcher argues that the White Paper and Red Paper were 
partially aligned in their goals to improve the “Indian problem,” but they conveyed 
different versions of “self-sufficiency” and varying forms of governance for Indian 
people.
473
 This chapter is focused on how the version of “equality” and “self-sufficiency” 
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for Indian people was articulated in both documents to show the radical difference 
between the respective interpretations and applications of the White Paper and Red 
Paper. 
 An understanding of how the Canadian government’s model of “self-sufficiency” 
would transform the Indian people from a state of dependency to self-sustaining 
individualism is important to a comprehension of the overall intent and impact of the 
White Paper. The federal government’s proposed model of “self-sufficiency” may be 
broadly described as a democratic parliamentary system or a parliamentary democracy.
474
  
The White Paper was comprised of three significant legislative proposals to create “self-
sufficiency:” to cumulatively remove the legal recognition of Indians; to remove all 
reference to the treaties; and to privatize “Indian land.” On the one hand, the White Paper 
stated that “Indian people’s role of dependence be replaced by a role of equal status, 
opportunity, and responsibility, a role they can share with all Canadians.”475 “Self-
sufficiency,” then, in the White Paper means “being self-sufficient” or “individual” and 
being able to provide for one’s economic well being.476  
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 Alternatively, the Red Paper considered treaties as embodying the source of “all 
their rights and status.”477 The IAA, in the Red Paper, argued that the proposals of the 
White Paper did not lead Indians to “equality” but to assimilation.478 The IAA’s 
president, Harold Cardinal, emphasized the organization’s position on “equality” and 
“self-sufficiency” by stating: “The Indians entered into the treaty negotiations as 
honourable men who came to deal as equals with the Queen’s representatives.”479 In 
other words, “self-sufficiency” as defined in the Red Paper meant that the nature of 
treaties demonstrated a mutually binding agreement signed between “equal” nations: the 
Crown and the Indian people.
480
 Moreover, as “equal” nations, the IAA implied, Indians 
retained the right to self-governance and that they had not surrendered that right to the 
Crown.  
 The researcher proposes that the concept of “self-sufficiency” was interpreted by 
the federal government and the IAA differently and that these differences are meaningful. 
The IAA’s version of “self-sufficiency” was as valid as that proposed in the White Paper, 
and the Red Paper was consistent with indigenous ancestral traditions of economic and 
political independence. Essentially, the Red Paper embraced a form of “self-sufficiency” 
that embodied economic and political independence for Indian people but also required 
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was minimal reliance on the federal government. While the White Paper defined “self-
sufficiency” by promoting total assimilation of Indian people into Canadian society 
through individualism, the Red Paper argued that “self-sufficiency” implied collectivity 
and further argued that treaties would economically sustain the community. The idea of 
individualism, in the view of the authors of the Red Paper, would not sustain the 
community. As the comparison made in this chapter will show, the White Paper and the 
Red Paper were radically different in advising how Indian people might achieve “self-
sufficiency.”  
 This chapter is divided into two sections. Section one briefly reviews the 
historical, legal and political relationship between the federal government and Indian 
people to show the historical relationship that the federal government’s White Paper was 
striving to dismantle. Historical legal agreements such as the 1763 Royal Proclamation, 
sections in the 1867 British North American Act, and the 1876 Indian Act defined the 
status of Indians and their relationship to the governance of Canada. The historical 
agreements also maintain, in part, the mutual responsibility agreed upon between both 
parties. For instance, the Royal Proclamation recognized Indians tribes as “nations,” 
which recognized the legal status of Indians and established the relationship between the 
government and Indian people. The researcher argues that the White Paper proposed the 
destruction of the historical relationships struck between the federal government and 
Indian people in agreements such as the Royal Proclamation. The White Paper proposed 
that Indians who assimilated into Canadian society would benefit from the liberal 
democratic ideals of individual “self-sufficiency.” In other words, the idea of “self-
sufficiency” as proposed in the White Paper required the destruction of all historical 
129 
agreements between the Crown and indigenous people, including treaties. The 
significance in the proposition to “end”  treaties, as defined in the White Paper, would be 
the elimination of the status of Indians and their agreed upon relationship to other 
Canadian citizens. 
 Section two provides a comparative analysis of the White Paper and the Red 
Paper dialogues on the six proposals identified in the White Paper framework for Indians 
to achieve equality. The purpose for this comparative analysis of the dialogue is to 
demonstrate how the two parties possessed two very different ideas of “self-sufficiency.” 
The idea of “self-sufficiency” as proposed in the White Paper was to assimilate Indian 
people into Canadian society. The Red Paper argued that the historical linkages and 
obligations held in the agreements were important to Indian people and also important to 
their ongoing relationship with the federal government. Moreover, the Red Paper argued 
that the government proposed relinquishment of its legal responsibility to Indians and to 
initiate a new relationship based on the liberal democratic ideas of individualism, 
equality, and freedom. The significance of this comparative dialogue is that, in 1970 the 
Indian leadership presented their counter-proposal the Red Paper to the government of 
Canada thereby asserting their (Indians) claim that treaties were important to the 
relationship between the federal government and Indian people. Essentially, by their 
(Indian leadership) presentations, they were making a political statement that treaties 
were signed, as “equal” partners between nations, the federal government and Indian 
people. As a result, the Red Paper continued to affirm the treaties as legitimate legal and 
sacred agreements that embodied the “source of all their [Indians] rights and status.” 
Moreover, the treaties continue to have relevance today, as they have never been settled 
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nor implemented since 1970, when the IAA brought the treaties to national 
consciousness. Nevertheless, after the dialogue between the White Paper and Red Paper, 
the federal government withdraw its White Paper in 1971.
481
  
 The relevance of this chapter is to show that treaties remain central to aboriginal 
“self-sufficiency” and this argument is important to my overall thesis because, as I have 
argued throughout this thesis, treaties provide social and economical provisions for treaty 
Indian people in Alberta. Put in a different way, the treaties remained important to the 
relationship between the government and Indian people because the treaties were signed 
between nations. Thus, the foundation of the Red Paper was built on the premise that 
treaties were “historic, moral, and legal agreements,” and further, the IAA argued that the 
three points of contention – the legal status of Indians, treaties, and lands – were 
important to maintain Indian “self-sufficiency.” These three points of contention, in the 
Red Paper, were inextricably linked to the treaties and “self-sufficiency” for Indian 
people, in three ways. First, the Red Paper argued that the legal status of Indians was not 
only essential for “justice,” but also was necessary for the recognition of the “history,” 
and “rights,” of Indian people.482 Although these “rights” were protected in the 1967 
British North American Act, the Red Paper stated that treaties contained all their “rights 
and status.” Second, the “rights and status” of Indians, according to the authors of the Red 
Paper, stemmed from the historical treaties as a result of land exchange between the 
government and Indian people.
483
 Further, the IAA argued to “modernize the treaties,” 
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according to the “spirit and intent” of the agreements to meet the evolving social and 
economic needs of Indian communities in Alberta.
484
 As a result, the treaties provided the 
foundation of the relationship between both parties and not the Indian Act. The Indian 
Act, according to the Red Paper, provided the framework for federal service programs for 
Indians just like the “many federal and provincial statutes” were provided for 
Canadians.
485
 This last assertion, by the Red Paper was significant; because the IAA was 
stating that treaty Indians were distinct from other Canadians due to the Indian Act and 
the treaties. Third, the Red Paper argued that Indian lands or reserve lands were held in 
trust by the Crown, but remained Indian lands.
486
 The statement by the Red Paper 
regarding land was also significant, because without land Indian communities could not 
sustain themselves economically. Essentially, the Red Paper argued that treaties were 
important to aboriginal “self-sufficiency” and for their (Indians) future generation yet 
“unborn.” Thus, the researcher argues that the 1970 Red Paper was a political statement 
on the importance of treaties as a means to aboriginal “self-sufficiency” and “equality” 
for First Nations people in Alberta. 
Pre existing Historical Agreements and Government and Indian Relationships 
 The formal beginnings of the political relationship established between the 
colonial government and Indian people may be found in the Royal Proclamation of 
1763.
487
 Although the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was largely part of a formal transfer 
of the colony of New France to Great Britain, the Proclamation also recognized “Indian 
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Territory.”488 In regard to Indians, two basic principles were identified: the recognition of 
“Indian Territory,” and that the various people within those territories were described as 
“nations.” The Royal Proclamation identified Indian “nations” as “autonomous political 
units living under the Crown’s protection, holding inherent authority over their internal 
affairs and the power to deal with the Crown by way of treaty and agreements.”489  The 
Proclamation also set protocols for acquiring and purchasing Indian lands through 
treaties.
490
 From this date forward, therefore, treaties became the sole legal means of land 
acquisition by the Crown from the Indians. Protocols in the Proclamation required the 
consent of the Indians, and only the Crown could negotiate land agreements through a 
“public meeting” or “assembly” with Indians.491 The British tradition of treaty making to 
acquire Indian lands using the protocols of the Proclamation continued well into 
Canadian Confederation. 
 The relationship between Indians and the colonial government was virtually 
unchanged until Canadian Confederation. In 1867, the British North American Act (the 
BNA Act, also known as the Constitution Act of 1867) gave birth to the Canadian state 
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through legislation from the British Crown.
492
 Although the BNA Act largely defined the 
powers shared between the provinces and the federal government, the Act also 
“respected, at least in principle, the basic tenets of the Royal Proclamation and reinforced 
the Crown’s duty to gain the consent of Indian nations” before extinguishing their title to 
land.
493
 Indians also became a federal responsibility under Section 91 (24) of the BNA 
Act leading to a historical relationship with the federal government that remains today.
494
 
Dale Turner states that with the inception of Section 91 (24) of the BNA Act, the federal 
government established its fiduciary relationship with Indians.
495 
After Confederation, the Crown continued to negotiate treaties with some First 
Nations people, primarily in the Western territories. The provision of land acquisition by 
the Crown required formal agreements by way of treaty, although contemporary debate 
has been raised about the legitimacy of the numbered treaties by both aboriginal and non-
aboriginal scholars.
496
 The courts interpret the historical treaties by the intent of the 
written text.
497
 However, as Borrows explains that “[s]ome might even view the treaties 
as filled with fraud, duress, and manipulation – or as expedient temporary bargains, 
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designed by the Crown to separate Indians from their lands and resources for the lowest 
possible price.”498  
 Under the Constitution Act of 1867, the newly formed Canadian state legislated 
Indians into existence under the authority of Section 91 (24), which read: “Indians, and 
Lands reserved for Indians.”499 Also under Section 91 (24), the federal government 
enacted the Indian Act.
500
 The federal government consolidated pre-Confederation 
legislation into this one Act the fundaments of which remain in place today.
501
 The goal 
of the Indian Act was to “assimilate” Indians into Canadian society and it has remained 
constant in that goal since its inception.
502
 The Indian Act virtually controlled, and 
continues to control, every aspect of Indians and community life from the definition of 
who could and who could not be an Indian, to the elective system for band council and 
chief, and the use of land.
503
 In essence, the Indian Act changed the nature of the 
relationship between the federal government and Indian people from a “nation-to-nation” 
relationship to one of paternalism as embedded in the Indian Act. Olive P. Dickason 
describes the Indian Act as “total institution...that touches on almost all aspects of the 
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lives of status Indians.”504 She states that both treaties and the Indian Act placed Indians 
in a separate constitutional category from other Canadians, but in different ways. As 
Dickason explains, treaties and the Indian Act are at “cross purposes; that from the 
Indian’s view, the Indian Act was restrictive and controlling,” whereas treaties “aim at 
accommodation through mutual agreement.”505 For Indians, according to Dickason, the 
Indian Act proposed to “remake” Indians, through education and social programs, with 
skills needed in Canadian society; however, the Act was in “violation” of the treaties.506 
Dickason explains that, for non-Indians, the Act had two purposes: Indian protection and 
advancement.
507
 Essentially, the Indian Act set the stage for Indians to be assimilated into 
Canadian society. By acquiring skills (such as those of manual labour), they might be 
seen as full participants of Canadian society. These goals were based in the liberal 
democratic values stressing European definitions of individualism and equality.
508
 This 
“long history” of the federal application of these values of the Euro-American liberal 
democratic tradition in relation to Indians began with the Indian Act, and continued into 
the next century when it was reaffirmed in the proposals made by the White Paper. The 
White Paper proposed to “end” the treaty relationship between Indians and the 
government, and terminate all relevance and responsibility owed to First Nation peoples 
with regard to the historical treaties. 
 The earliest treaties between indigenous people and Europeans were “peace and 
friendship” treaties found primarily on the East Coast of Canada in what are now the 
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Maritime Provinces. After the Royal Proclamation of 1763, peace was not the focus of 
treaties: the new focus was land.
509
 Later, in 1850, the Robinson Treaties were signed and 
followed the pattern set out in the Royal Proclamation.
510
 After the Confederation of 
1867, the number treaties, also known as the historical treaties, were signed between the 
years 1871 to 1921.
511
 The historical treaties covered vast regions of what are now 
northern Ontario, the Prairie Provinces, and parts of the Northwest Territories.
512
 On the 
Western Prairies, particularly in Alberta, three treaties were signed in 1876 (Treaty 6); in 
1877 (Treaty 7); and, in 1899 (Treaty 8).
513
 Although the treaties are now part of history, 
their importance is still very much relevant to First Nations people whose ancestors 
signed them with the Crown. 
 Several recent books reinforce the importance of the treaties, including research 
by Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council (1996), Hugh Dempsey (1987), Richard Price 
(1986), John Snow (1977), and Harold Cardinal (1969). All focus on the importance of 
treaties in general, and also deal, to variable degree, with the indigenous understanding of 
the treaties.
514
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contemporary research and understanding of treaties is consistent with the elders’ 
understanding and interpretation of Treaty 7.
515
  
 The authors of the book (1996) The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7, 
gathered the “collective memory” of Treaty 7 elders and to determine what the “spirit and 
intent” Treaty 7 encompassed.516 Treaty 7, also known as the “Blackfoot Treaty” includes 
the Bloods, Siksika, Peigan, Stoney, and Tsuu T’ina (Sarcee).517 Although the meaning 
and interpretation of Treaty 7 by both parties (the federal government negotiators and the 
indigenous signatories) remains far from consensus, Treaty 7 elders’ maintain that the 
agreement struck in 1877 was to “share” the land rather than a land surrender.518 In other 
words, the elders explained that the treaty was understood to be a “peace treaty” to 
“share” the land between the Blackfoot, their allies, and the new arrivals. In exchange for 
sharing the land, according to the elders, the Crown was committed to provide treaty 
promises. Generally, these promises included agriculture, education, healthcare, and 
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hunting, fishing, and gathering.
519
 Nevertheless, the signing of Treaty 7 could be taken to 
mean that the “spirit and intent” of the agreement, as seen by Treaty 7 First Nations, was 
a nation-to-nations agreement. This argument that Treaty 7 was a nation-to-nation 
agreement is consistent with the Red Paper’s argument that treaties were signed between 
nations. Moreover, the elders of Treaty 7 saw their treaty with the Crown, as a “sacred” 
agreement.
520
  
 What is sacred about treaties and why did this concept of treaty impact the 
development of the Red Paper?  In 1970, when the IAA presented its Red Paper to the 
federal government as an alternative to assimilation as proposed in the White Paper and 
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Museum, 1991), xiv. William Graham worked for the Indian Affairs department between 
1885 to his retirement in 1932. His book’s original focus was an autobiography, but 
instead it focused on Graham’s observations of Indian life. His observations of Indian life 
and customs, was sometimes “tempered by his limited understanding of Indian 
culture...as it reflect[ed] attitudes and perceptions that was probably shared by many 
Indian Department officials,” during that time period. The book is relevant because it 
shares insights from first hands accounts from a retired senior Indian Department official 
about the importance of Indian cultures and ceremonial practices. Also see The Final 
Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 2, part 1: Restructuring the 
Relationship (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996), 22. 
Recommendation 2.2.1 “Historical treaties were meant by all parties to be sacred and 
enduring....”  
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introduced by the Indian Act, embedded in the document’s foundation was an important 
interpretation of the significance of the treaties. The IAA stated that the treaties continue 
to be significant and a source of importance for treaty Indian people in Alberta, and that 
treaty was understood by the community as “solemn agreements.”521 The radical 
difference between the White Paper and Red Paper was the fact that the government 
wanted to “end” all historical agreements including the treaties, while the IAA argued 
that treaties were “sacred” representations of “their rights and status.”522 Conceptually, 
the federal government proposed in the White Paper the destruction of the historic 
relationship between themselves and Indian people, and suggested the replacement of the 
relationship created by the historical agreements with their interpretation of liberal 
democratic ideas of individualism, equality, and freedom. Although Indian lands had 
been surrendered via the treaties, Indian people’s “inalienable” right to govern 
themselves was not extinguished, but remained in force.
523
 In respect to “self-
sufficiency,” the Red Paper argued that treaty Indians had a sovereign right to govern 
themselves within their communities in all matters that concerned them and that the 
historical agreements must remain firmly in place. 
 
                                                     
521
 The Indian Association of Alberta, Citizens Plus: the Red Paper, 7. 
522
 Harold Cardinal, The Unjust Society, 1. 
523 
Augie Fleras and Jean Leonard Elliott, The Nations Within: Aboriginal-State Relations 
in Canada, the United States, and New Zealand (Toronto, Oxford University Press, 
1992), 30. Also see Colin H. Scott, “Custom, Tradition, and the Politics of Culture: 
Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada,” in Anthropology, Public Policy and Native 
Peoples in Canada, ed. Noel Dyck and James B. Waldram (Montreal: McGill-Queens 
University Press, 1993), 311-333. Scott stated that under the Constitution Act 1982, 
aboriginal leaders interpreted section 35 (1) to include “inherent” right to self-
government. The “inherent” right to self-government will be discussed further below. 
 
140 
Comparing the White Paper and the Red Paper  
 For the federal government of the 1960s, the liberal values of individualism, 
equality, and their concept of freedom were a paramount feature of the 1969 White 
Paper. Turner’s contemporary analysis in (2006) This Is Not a Peace Pipe offers insight 
into how the Liberal government of the time was defining liberal theories of 
individualism, equality, and the meaning of freedom as a value that they proposed should 
be adopted by Indian people. As Turner states, “a good theory of justice has to be 
couched in the language of individual, freedom, and equality.”524 “Equality” was 
frequently cited in the White Paper in 1969. The White Paper stated that Indians were 
“free to develop Indian cultures in an environment of legal, social, and economic equality 
in the manner equal to other non-indigenous Canadians.”525 To achieve this federal 
version of “equality,” the White Paper proposed to completely assimilate Indians into the 
Canadian population.  
 Conversely, the Red Paper resisted all attempts at assimilation. The Red Paper 
argued that the treaties were written by equal partners indeed by sovereign nations, and 
thus these agreements provided all their rights and, further, that the government would 
need to honour the agreements made to Indian people. Below I offer excerpts from the 
White Paper and Red Paper, in order to reveal the comparative dialogue on the six 
proposals evident in the White Paper. The six proposals were grounded in a framework 
for Indian people to achieve “equality,” and the framework provided the focal point of 
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discussion that is evident in the arguments of the respective documents. The dialogue 
demonstrates where the two parties disclose very different ideas of “self-sufficiency.” 
Whereas the White Paper proposed the destruction of the historical agreements, 
particularly the treaties, the Red Paper argued that the treaties were important agreements 
and that they could be as source of governance for Indian people. 
  Approximately one year after the federal government’s announcement of its 
White Paper proposal, the Indian leadership requested a meeting with the government of 
Canada.
526
 The request for a meeting with the government, would give the Indian 
leadership an opportunity to present its Red Paper to the government using traditional 
methods of diplomacy. Borrows describes traditional indigenous governance system as 
having “diplomacy,” or a process or protocol that involved long orations between parties 
before treaties were agreed upon.
527
 Nevertheless, on the fourth of June 1970, the IAA 
presented its Red Paper to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and his cabinet at the historic 
Railway Committee Room of the Parliament buildings, in Ottawa.
528
 A journalist 
recording the event, Rudy Platiel described the meeting at the Railway committee Room:  
 In a scene that deserves to be preserved in oil paints on a giant canvas, Indian 
 leaders stood majestically in feathered headdresses and white deerskin garb and 
 presented the cabinet with an alternative (Citizen Plus). It was an affirmation of 
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 faith in their Indian identity. After a century of being engulfed by a white tidal 
 wave, they were still here, they were still different, and they were not about to let 
 themselves be pushed into oblivion.
529
  
 
 Platiel’s description of the Indian leaders in “feather headdresses and deerskin garb” at 
the presentation of the Red Paper in 1970, reinforced the general view of Indians by the 
mainstream press and Canadian society more generally.
530
 Regardless, the “feather 
headdress and deerskin garb” was an effective strategy by the Indian leadership. The Red 
Paper presentation to the government of Canada provided an opportunity for the Indian 
leadership to exercise ancient governance systems.
531
 For example, the headdress in 
Blackfoot society is symbolic of personal achievement, and achievement was, and 
continues to be, recognized in Blackfoot society whether elected to a political position or 
to a ceremonial a role. The wearing of traditional “garb,” was also effective because the 
Indian leadership was making a political statement that treaties were important 
agreements to Indian people and to the relationship between the federal government and 
Indian people. Essentially, what the Indian leadership was saying was that, we are going 
to address to you (the government of Canada) our concerns over your White Paper 
proposal and present to you our alternative solution to combat poverty in our 
communities, and on our terms. 
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  According to Turner, the first sentence of the Red Paper stated the Indian 
position: “To us who are treaty Indians there is nothing more important than our Treaties, 
our lands, and the well being of our future generation.”532 At this public gathering in 
1970, Chief Adam Solway read from the White Paper while Chief John Snow countered 
the White Paper proposals with assertions from the Red Paper: 
 Solway: White Paper - “that legislative and constitutional basis of discrimination 
 should  be removed.” 
 
 Snow: Red Paper - “the legislative and constitutional basis for Indians status and 
 rights  should be maintained until such times as Indian people are prepared and 
 willing to renegotiate them.” 
 
 Solway: White Paper - “there should be a positive recognition of the unique 
 contribution of Indian culture to Canadian life.” 
 Snow: Red Paper - “these are nice sounding words which are intended to mislead 
 everybody. The only way to maintain our culture is for us to remain as Indians. 
 To preserve our culture it is necessary to preserve our status, rights, and lands and 
 traditions. Our treaties are the basis of our rights.” 
 Solway: White Paper - “that services come through the same channels and from 
 the same government agencies for all Canadians.” 
 Snow: Red Paper - “We say that the Federal Government is bound to the British 
 North American Act, Section 91, Head 24, to accept legislative responsibility for 
 ‘Indians and lands reserved for them.’” 
 Solway: White Paper - “that those who are furthest behind be helped most.” 
 Snow: Red Paper - “We do not want different treatment for different tribes. These 
 promises of enriched services are bribes to get us to accept the rest of the policy. 
 The Federal Government is trying to divide us Indian people so it can conquer us 
 by saying that poorer reserves will be helped most.” 
 Solway: White Paper - “That lawful obligations be recognized.” 
 Snow: Red Paper - “If the Government meant what it said we would be happy. 
 But it is obvious that the Government has never bothered to learn what the 
 treaties are and has a distorted picture of them.” 
 Solway: White Paper - “That control of lands be transferred to the Indian people.” 
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 Snow: Red Paper - “We agree with this intent but we find the Government is 
 ignorant of two basic points. The Government wrongly thinks that Indian 
 reserves lands are owned by the Crown. The Government is, of course in error. 
 These lands are held in trust by the Crown but they are Indian lands...The  second 
 error the Government commits is making the assumption that Indians can have 
 control of the land only if they take ownership in the way ordinary property is 
 owned. [Indian lands] must be held forever in trust of the Crown because, as we 
 say, ‘The true owners of the land are yet unborn.’”533 
Weaver described the atmosphere once the Red Paper presentation ceased:  
 “After the Chiefs’ delivery, they placed a copy of the White Paper on the table in 
 front of Chrétien, indicating official rejection, and a copy of the Red Paper was 
 handed to the prime minister, signalling their intent to begin discussing counter 
 proposals.”534  
According to Weaver, although the Prime Minister’s speech fell “short of an apology,” he 
responded candidly to the Red Paper presentation to the surprise of all attending the 
meeting:
535
 
 “And I’m sure that we were very naive in some of the statements we made in the 
 paper. We had perhaps the prejudices of small ‘l’ liberals and white men at that 
 who taught that equality meant the same law for everybody, and that’s why as a 
 result of this we said, ‘well let’s abolish the Indian Act and make Indians citizens 
 of Canada like everyone else. And let’s make Indian dispose of their lands just 
 like every other Canadian. And let’s make sure that Indians can get their rights, 
 education, health and so on, from the governments like every other Canadian.’ 
 But we have learnt in the process that perhaps we were a bit too theoretical, we 
 were a bit too abstract, we were not, as Mr. Cardinal suggests, perhaps pragmatic 
 enough or understanding enough, and that’s fine. We are here to discuss this.”536 
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Weaver reflected that Trudeau’s concluding comments “shocked” the audience.537 
Although Weaver did not elaborate on her comment about the Prime Minister’s remarks 
that “shocked” the audience; her comment could be interpreted to mean that the Prime 
Minister was prepared to rescind the White Paper. This position was in stark contrast 
from a year previous when the government proposed to end its legal responsibility with 
Indians. As Trudeau stated, 
 “But let me just say that we will be meeting again and we will be furthering the 
 dialogue, and let me just say, we are in no hurry if you’re not. You know, a 
 hundred years has been a long time and if you don’t want to answer in another 
 year, we’ll take two, three, five, ten, or twenty – the time you people decide to 
 come to grips with this problem. And we won’t force any solution on you, 
 because we are not looking for any particular solution.”538 
Weaver shows how this conclusion was “interpreted as the Prime Minister’s assurance 
that the government would not press the White Paper on Indians.”539 Although there was 
no mention of the Red Paper’s two strategies (education and economic development) to 
solve poverty in Indian communities, Trudeau’s comments seem to indicate that an 
existing “Indian problem” was worthy of fixing, or that poverty would remain until “you 
people [Indians] decide to come to grips with this problem.”540 Nevertheless, the 
significance of the public dialogue shows how the White Paper and Red Paper 
incorporated differing routes to “self-sufficiency” for Indian people. The White Paper 
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proposed the destruction of the historic agreements because they hindered Indians full 
immersion into Canadian life. This relationship, in their proposal, would be replaced with 
the liberal ideas of individualism, equality, and freedom. The Red Paper countered with 
arguments that the historical agreements must not be dismantled and further that the 
treaties must be recognized and acknowledged by the federal government. Moreover, by 
arguing for treaty implementation, the Red Paper implied that treaties were a potential 
source of governance for Indian people. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the researcher argued that the 1969 White Paper and the 1970 Red 
Paper were aligned in their goals to improve the “Indian problem,” but they conveyed 
different versions of “self-sufficiency” and varying forms of governance for Indian 
people. The White Paper proposed that Indians who assimilated into Canadian society 
would benefit from the liberal democratic ideals of individual “self-sufficiency.” In 
essence, the White Paper proposed that the liberal democratic values would “free” Indian 
people from “discriminatory” legislation such as that deriving from the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, the Constitution Act 1867, the Indian Act 1876, and the historical 
treaties. The White Paper proposed the destruction of the historical agreements that 
formed the foundation between the federal government and Indian people. 
In contrast, the Red Paper defined “self-sufficiency” through the historical treaties 
signed between the Crown and Indian people. The Red Paper argued the treaties were 
signed between equal nations and, that treaties encompassed all their “rights and status.” 
The historical treaties were the foundation of the relationship between Indians and the 
government, and the IAA held the government to account for the promises made to 
147 
Indian people in the Red Paper. Nevertheless, after the Red Paper presentation in June 
1970, the federal government officially withdrew its White Paper proposal in 1971, 
including three points of contestation regarding the legal status of Indians, treaties, and 
Indian lands. 
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Final Conclusion 
 The research question that initiated this study was to explore the political 
significance of the IAA authored 1970 Red Paper written for and by treaty Indian people 
in Alberta. The Red Paper, as I have shown, was a critical response to the 1969 federal 
White Paper on Indian policy. This thesis examined how the 1970 Red Paper regarded 
the historical treaties as sacred agreements countering the assertions made otherwise in 
the federal government’s White Paper. In my view, the Red Paper effectively 
demonstrated the contemporary relevance of treaty Indian people in Alberta. Moreover, 
the Red Paper was a political statement expressing resistance to the assertions of the 
federal White Paper.  
 “Self-sufficiency,” in the Red Paper, was not understood as individually defined 
but as a collective understanding that linked “self-sufficiency” to the treaties signed with 
the Crown; the treaties, as I have stressed throughout the thesis, were understood as 
nation-to-nation agreements and these agreements continue to have sustained relevance in 
defining the contemporary relationship between both parties. Alternatively, the concept 
of “self-sufficiency” in the White Paper proposed assimilation of Indians into mainstream 
Canadian society. The method of assimilation evident in the White Paper was 
individualized “self-sufficiency,” where Indians would be enabled to individually 
participate in Canadian society and governance. 
 The contemporary relevance of the 1970 Red Paper and the 1969 White Paper 
was that, the clash of these documents created a watershed for native activism. This 
struggle for federal recognition of those rights continues today. Although the federal 
White Paper challenged native activism by proposing “equality” to Indians, the Red 
Paper aggressively resisted these ideas proposed by the federal government. As a result, 
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by 1971, in the face of the forceful criticisms convincingly argued by the Red Paper, the 
federal government withdrew its White Paper on Indians. The implications after 1971 for 
Indians were that the Red Paper had provided an effective catalyst to assert and advance 
Indian recognition of treaty rights which subsequently were affirmed and recognized in 
the 1982 Constitution Act. Indirectly, however, various other decisions shepherded 
through the judicial system also affirmed the diverse range of rights of aboriginal people 
in Canada. For instance, in the 1973 Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 
decision at the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) level, the court affirmed indigenous 
rights existed as an interest held in the land.
541
 The Nisga’a Nation of British Columbia 
based their claim on their occupancy of the land, since time immemorial, in the Nass 
Valley.
542
 Three justices voted against the Nisga’a claim and three in favour, while the 
seventh justice voted against based on a “technicality.”543 Although the Calder case had 
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not been won at the SCC level, the national significance of the case was the legal 
recognition of the existence of aboriginal title in Canadian law. Moreover this title 
continued to exist without being “extinguished without ‘clear and plain intent.’”544 The 
government was therefore forced to reconsider the rights held by indigenous people to the 
land. With additional tensions created by the assertions made by the White Paper and 
subsequently challenged by the Red Paper, Indian people no longer “accept[ed] being 
relegated to the margins of Canadian society,” and the government was rapidly 
confronted by the emergence of a new political relationship and more active constituents 
of Indian leadership and community.
545
 Increasingly recognized was that indigenous 
people at the national level had the right to assert their rights based on historical 
agreements or even, the lack of such documentation of rights. The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s (SCC) 1973 decision in the Calder case546 regarding aboriginal interest in the 
land would set the government/indigenous relationship in a new direction. 
 The Calder decision established that First Nations people still held an indigenous 
interest in the land, if no existing treaty had extinguished title. In other words, the Calder 
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decision of 1973 and the 1982 Constitution Act following the 1970 Red Paper set the 
tone for a new political relationship between the federal government and Indian people. 
Thus, it can be stated that the innovation of government/indigenous relationships were 
reinforced by judicial decisions like Calder and the inclusion of the Section 35 (1) in the 
1982 Constitution Act. As Section 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, reinforced “the existing 
Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada are hereby recognized 
and affirmed.”547 The 1970 Red Paper early advocated a model of “self sufficiency” 
based on education and economic development whereas the subsequent 1982 
Constitution Act advocated self-government through treaty. Moreover, the ideas of “self-
sufficiency” first articulated in the 1970 Red Paper continue to have relevance to 
contemporary scholarly discussion, particularly with regards to reinforcing the rights and 
ideas of self-government.  
 The political relationship between aboriginal people and the federal government 
after the White Paper has been characterized as an “Indian Quiet Revolution.”548 
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However for Indians, the relationship with the federal government in the 1970s was not 
so “quiet.” For example, in his book titled Home and Native Land (1984), Michael Asch 
reviews significant events of the 1970s for Indian people that also had an impact on the 
inclusion of Section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act.
549
 As previously mentioned, the 
1969 White Paper was the watershed for Indians to actively assert their rights against 
federal government’s denial of rights. For example, Yvonne Bedard of the Six Nations 
Indian Reserve challenged the federal government’s Indian Act legislation on the ground 
that she lost her Indian status when she married a non-Indian man.
550
 Bedard was 
concerned that the Indian Act violated the “equality before the law” provision of the 
Canadian Bill of Rights. In its decision [1973] the Court held that the Indian Act might 
discriminate against women but it did not violate the Bill of Rights as long as the Indian 
Act applied equality to all Indian women.
551
 Nevertheless, other similar and major 
challenges regarding equity eventually came before the courts during the White Paper 
and Red Paper exchange, and these judicial cases would set the relationship between 
government and Indian people on firmer footing regarding the rightful and constitutional 
inclusion of indigenous interests particularly around governance. The momentum of 
Indian activism of the 1970s continued with the Red Paper, spilled over into the 1980s.  
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 The 1980s also witnessed national negotiations for the inclusion of an “aboriginal 
rights” section of the 1982 Constitution Act,552 whereby the Constitution was successful 
passed with the inclusion of Section 35(1).
553
 This addition subsequently allowed for the 
intensification of Indian demands for self-government. There existed controversy over 
what the word “existing” would mean. Aboriginal scholars, such as Little Bear, noted that 
Section 35(1) acknowledge only legally recognized rights and did not apply to rights that, 
according to Canada’s legal system, have been extinguished or superseded by law.”554 
Other scholars, such as Ian Waddell, claimed that word “existing” was essentially added 
to “placate” Premiers and the Department of Justice, but with no real adverse effect.555 
However, some aboriginal scholars, such as Lee Maracle, questioned the legitimacy of 
Section 35(1) as well as the supremacy of the Canadian state in relation to their rights to 
define or limit treaty and aboriginal rights. By “relying on s.35, Indigenous Peoples have 
to accept the Canadian Constitution as the “Supreme Law” through which our rights as 
Nations should be decided,” Maracle wrote .556 Nevertheless, the “inherent” right to self-
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government, in so far as that right has not being surrendered, is generally accepted as a 
critical part of “existing” aboriginal rights.557 After the federal White Paper, however, 
there emerged numerous texts focused solely on policy and, legal and administrative 
aspects of self-government,
558
 but this literature fails to address or successfully identify 
those indigenous institutions.  
 Aboriginal self-government has become the subject of a growing body of 
literature, with publications particularly in the 1980s and 1990s.
559
 Additionally, two 
anthologies on self-government show how divergent views are evident, including for 
instance Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trend and Issues (1999) and 
Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends and Issues (2008).
560
 As 
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 Colin H. Scott, “Custom, Tradition, and the Politics of Culture: Aboriginal Self-
Government in Canada,” in Anthropology, Public Policy and Native Peoples in Canada, 
ed. Noel Dyck and James B. Waldram (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 
1993), 311-333. Scott explained that a series of Canadian First Ministers’ Conferences 
took place in the years 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1987 between aboriginal leaders and the 
two levels of governments (federal and provincial). The purpose to the conferences was 
to determine the nature of self-government. The federal and provincial governments had 
a “limited” perspective of self-government in two areas: “cultural survival and the 
resolution of socio-economic problems besetting aboriginal people, 316. While aboriginal 
leaders thought of self-government in broader scope to include, “cultural rights to the 
historical priority of aboriginal peoples, and to an institutionally comprehensive 
definition of cultural survival,” 317. 
558
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mentioned earlier, many argue that aboriginal governance was not surrendered by 
previous legislation and therefore the literature on self-government is reflective of this 
notion. As Yale Belanger suggests, aboriginal self-government began at the community 
level, “sparked by leaders seeking to create healthy and stable governments to foster 
community well-being.”561 Although the Red Paper was largely the result of large scale 
community involvement, the IAA was also aware that they had not surrender their right 
to govern themselves; “As representatives of our people we are pledged to continue our 
earnest efforts to preserve the hereditary and legal privileges of our people.”562 In other 
words, while the English language used in the Red Paper was not articulated in a fashion 
exactly legible to contemporary readers, the intention and meanings are harmonious. That 
is, the underlying meaning of the above statement called for greater recognition of their 
inherent right to govern themselves. It is my observation that literature on self-
government, since the early 1970s, did not only reaffirmed the Red Paper’s position 
regarding “self-sufficiency” (in terms of not surrendering their powers to govern 
themselves by treaty nor legislation), but also similarly advocated for broader powers to 
include “institutions” and a “land” base.563 Generally, the current literature since the Red 
Paper of 1970 on the topic of treaty and aboriginal rights discourse has reaffirmed and 
acknowledged the Red Paper’s points of advocacy established in 1970; the most 
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important of which was to reinforce that treaties are important to aboriginal people of 
Canada. In many ways, the Red Paper not only advocated for indigenous “self-
sufficiency,” but prepared the stage for future negotiations, future legal decisions, and 
constitutional change.  The Red Paper, therefore, was an early precedent in redefining, 
from an indigenous perspective, Indian peoples place within Canadian society.   
 In many ways the points of contestation as exemplified in the public dispute 
between the federal government’s White Paper and the IAA’s Red Paper remain of 
interest in academic literature, particularly in the era after the 1982 Constitution Act. The 
Constitution Act entrenched aboriginal treaty rights in Section 35(1), and, as a 
consequence, the longstanding debate around inherent right to self-government was 
reignited. Although the debate continues in academic literature, there is no real consensus 
between indigenous leaders and the federal government on the meaning held in Section 
35(1), and thus the political implications of the Section continues to develop. In 
retrospect, the catalyst for contemporary discussion around Section 35 (1) may be traced 
back to the IAA’s Red Paper of 1970, the paper was a true affirmation and recognition of 
a “Just Society” but not as the White Paper or Trudeau had defined “justice” but rather 
with First Nations as self-determining and in control of all aspects of their lives as 
indigenous people first, and Canadians second. This thesis has shown that the historical 
treaties were important to First Nations people representative of the 1970 Red Paper, and 
that Indians continue to see the treaties as significant to their contemporary relationship 
with the state. Thus advocacy for treaty implementation remains to be done not only in 
scholarly literature by indigenous leaders of the present and possibly in the future. 
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